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"Charlie, you were my bruddah. You shoulda looked out for me a little bit. I
coulda had class, I coulda been a contendah. .."
Marlon Brando, playing Terry Malloy in ON THE WATERFRONT (Columbia
1954).1
I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the impact of state laws designed to protect
the role of health care professionals as advocates for their patients on
American health care delivery during the last decade. During the
1990's managed care spread rapidly, largely replacing the fee for ser-
vice health care system,2 and changing both the practice and the per-
ception of providing health care services in America. As horror stories
circulated of risk-sharing arrangements that lead to denial of medi-
cally necessary care,3 Draconian utilization review, 4 "gagging" of phy-
sicians in their communications with patients, 5 and as many patients
began to have more impersonal and transient relationships with their
doctors, there was an inevitable backlash against managed care's
goals of cost containment and the more active and effective manage-
1. In this scene, Rod Steiger plays the part of Charlie, a mob boss, and Marlon
Brando plays his younger brother, Terry. Terry confronts his brother for his fail-
ure to keep an eye out for Terry's interests, rather than the mob's. Terry's sor-
rowful complaint, "Charlie, you were my bruddah. You shoulda looked out for me
a little bit," identifies the essence of fiduciary duty - a fiduciary is a person who
looks out for the little guy he is supposed to protect. This article examines fiduci-
ary obligations in another context - that of the health care professional who must
look out for the patient's interests in gaining access to medically necessary health
care.
2. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 369-70 (2002) (describing
the evolution of health care in the United States over the last decade and the
trend away from indemnity insurance toward managed care as the predominant
mode of health care financing).
3. See, e.g., Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, "Extreme Risk - The New
Corporate Proposition for Physicians," 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1706 (1995); see
also Michael A. Hiltzik & David R. Olmos, Pressure is Mounting for Better Over-
sight of HMOS .. , L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1995, at Al (discussing proposed solu-
tions to the oversight of cost reduction practices by HMOs).
4. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
that a state law negligence claim for improper utilization review decisonmaking
leading to the death of plaintiffs' fetus was preempted under ERISA § 5 14(a), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), because it "relate[d] to" an employee benefit plan, even while
recognizing that this decision left the plaintiffs without a remedy for their loss).
5. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, MANAGED CARE: EXPLICIT GAG
CLAUSES NOT FOUND IN HMO CONTRACTS, BUT PHYSICIAN CONCERNS REMAIN 1
(GAO/HEHS 97-175 August 1997) (hereinafter GAO GAG CLAUSE REPORT). The
GAO GAG CLAUSE REPORT found no explicit gag clause in any of more than a
thousand managed care provider contracts, but did find some clauses that could
be interpreted by health care providers as limiting their ability to freely discuss
all treatment options with their patients. Id. at 2-3.
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ment of patient care.6 As part of this backlash, many states enacted
statutes to protect health care professionals (HCPs) who advocated on
behalf of their patients, declaring that HCPs could not be terminated
from a managed care organization (MCO) or otherwise penalized be-
cause of their advocacy. 7
Now that we are several years into this counterattack on managed
care, it is appropriate to consider whether these state advocacy protec-
tion laws have made any difference, either for health care profession-
als or for the patients on whose behalf they are advocating.8 A broad
range of possibilities is apparent. One could view advocacy protection
laws as a cheap and meretricious political fix, adopted by politicians
anxious to demonstrate their concern to the electorate without really
doing anything about systemic problems with managed care. One
could decide that these laws are largely irrelevant, since changes in
the healthcare marketplace and the enormous wave of public opinion
against managed care have already caused managed care organiza-
tions to eliminate their most offensive cost-containment strategies.9
Or one could conceive of these laws as scripts for modem "morality
plays," providing updated versions of frontier dramas in the tradition
of the shoot-out at the OK Corral.1o Pursuing the metaphor further,
6. Passions run high on this subject and, of course, "managed care" is an umbrella
term, embracing a broad spectrum of approaches to health care delivery and fi-
nancing. Like the elephant that is examined by three blind persons, managed
care's appearance and impact depends on the context and the audience. In this
article, I have tried to adopt a value-neutral description of managed care's goals.
7. Since 1993, seventeen states have adopted statutes explicitly protecting patient
advocacy by health care professionals. Many more states adopted statutes which
implicitly protected such advocacy, including many laws prohibiting "gag clauses"
in health care professionals' contracts with managed care organizations. These
laws will be discussed in detail in Part III infra.
8. In undertaking this evaluation, it is important to consider both formal legal au-
thority (published opinions, statutes, and regulations) and informal sources of
law (including negotiated settlements, individual jury verdicts, and the practical
experience of working lawyers). Paying attention to these nontraditional, infor-
mal sources of legal authority is essential when one recognizes that over 95% of
all civil cases are settled before trial. Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial,
88 A.B.A. J. 24, 26 (2002); see also THEODORE Y. BLUMHOF, MARGARET Z. JOHNS,
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, PRETRIAL DIscovERY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROFES-
SIONAL JUDGMENT 11 (1993) (emphasizing the significance of discovery in light of
the fact that most cases are settled prior to trial). Indeed, many cases are re-
solved without resort to litigation at all. BLUrMHOF et al., at 11. For further devel-
opment of the argument that to be effective, lawyers need to consider both formal
and informal sources of the law, see Thomas M. McDonnell, Playing Beyond the
Rules: A Realist and Rhetoric-Based Approach to Researching the Law and Solv-
ing Legal Problems, 67 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 285, 286-89 (1998).
9. This view has been suggested by Professors Gail Agriwal and Mark Hall.
10. This concept was used by Clark C. Havighurst, with compelling frontier refer-
ences, to describe consumer class actions, most notably those suits brought
against managed care organizations, in Consumers Versus Managed Care: The
New Class Actions, 20 HEALTH AFF. 8, 10 (2001).
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one could envision these statutes functioning as "the equalizer," alter-
ing the power balance between MCOs, HCPs, and their patients, to
ensure that HCPs will effectively protest denials of medically neces-
sary and appropriate care, and thus fulfill their fiduciary obligation to
act on the patient's behalf, without giving in to economic pressures to
comply with MCO rules. In this scenario, advocacy protection laws
would both vindicate the rights of individual HCPs who have been ter-
minated and serve as a powerful deterrent to inappropriate MCO cost
containment strategies, by encouraging HCPs to be forceful advocates
for necessary patient care, knowing that their conduct will be
protected.
II. A ROAD MAP
This article will explore the history, implementation, and impact of
state advocacy protection statutes. The article is in four major parts.
The first Part provides an introduction to the concept of advocacy,
both as it was understood at common law, and as it is presently inter-
preted by HCPs and MCOs. The article will also examine the phe-
nomenon of HCPs' "deselection," that is, the termination or non-
renewal of their contracts with MCOs. In this context, the article will
highlight the distinction between anecdote and data and emphasize
the paucity of hard evidence to support either side's version of the
truth about these HCP-MCO interactions.
The second part will survey the legislative and common law land-
scape surrounding HCP advocacy. The article will look first at state
statutes that explicitly protect HCP advocacy on behalf of patients,
and then consider the large group of statutes that provide supplemen-
tal support for such advocacy. These include laws that implicitly pro-
tect such advocacy, by providing other "Managed Care Bill of Rights"
protections for patients, providing procedural due process protections
for HCPs who are deselected from an MCO, or otherwise attempting to
rein in cost containment efforts by MCOs. The article will also con-
sider other federal and state statutes that could be used by HCPs as
part of their arsenal in suits against MCOs. Finally, the article will
address common law protections for HCP advocacy, examining the
cases that have been brought by HCPs to challenge their deselection
by an MCO, as well as additional common law theories that might be
used creatively on behalf of deselected HCPs.
The third part will review the implementation of state advocacy
protection statutes. Federal preemption is an important potential
hurdle to litigants, as both ERISAii and the Medicare program' 2 have
arguably carved out a significant regulatory domain free from state
11. ERISA is the acronym for the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of
1974, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2003).
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incursion. In addition, there are state law interpretation problems for
an HCP litigant, as well as burden of proof and discovery issues that
may make it difficult for deselected HCPs to prevail against MCOs
that no longer want their services.
The fourth part will consider whether state advocacy protection
laws make any difference for HCPs or their patients. This paper will
evaluate the efficacy of these laws, and conclude that they have a lim-
ited in terrorem effect, making it somewhat harder for MCOs to termi-
nate HCPs who advocate for their patients. After concluding that
current legal rules are inadequate to ensure that health care profes-
sionals will vigorously advocate for their patients, I suggest alterna-
tive means to encourage and support patient advocacy, which will
improve the resolution of disputes among managed care organiza-
tions, health care professionals, and patients, and will enhance the
quality of health care delivery.
III. WHAT IS ADVOCACY?
A. Fiduciary Duty
Defining the concept of advocacy is critical to exploring the rela-
tionship between health care professionals and their patients. An ad-
vocacy definition is also needed to understand the dynamic
underpinnings of the struggle between HCPs and MCOs over who
should determine the care a particular patient needs and will receive.
Organized American medicine has long believed that no outsider
should interfere with the physician's relationship to the patient. 13 In
part this reflects ancient notions of a physician's special, fiduciary ob-
ligations to the patient,14 which Hans Jonas has described as a "sa-
12. Medicare is the federal health insurance entitlement program providing health
insurance coverage to persons over 65, those suffering from end-stage renal dis-
ease, and, in certain circumstances, people with disabilities. It is governed by
Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395-1395ggg (2003). In 1997,
Congress created Medicare+Choice (or M+C) managed care programs, which are
available to Medicare beneficiaries who choose a managed care delivery model for
their health care services. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21 (2003). The Medicare+Choice
program is governed by extensive regulations, found in 42 C.F.R. Part 422 (2003).
13. See, e.g., Paul Starr, WHITHER HEALTH CARE? THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICINE 27 (1982); GEORGE J. ANNAS, SYLVIA A. LAw, RAND E. ROSEN-
BLAI1r & KENNETH R. WING, AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 15-16 (1990).
14. The Hippocratic Oath, which has been part of medical training for more than
2500 years, provides in part: " I will apply... measures for the benefit of the sick
according to my ability and judgment; I will keep them from harm and injus-
tice .... Whatever houses I may visit, I will come for the benefit of the sick,
remaining free of all intentional injustice.. . ." MARSHA GARRISON AND CARL E.
SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF BIOETHICS: INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL REGULA-
TION 7 (2003); JUDITH AREEN, PATRICIA A. KING, STEVEN GOLDBERG, & ALEXANDER
MORGAN CAPRON, LAW, SCIENCE, & MEDICINE 273 (1984); see also ROBERT M.
VEACH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 21-25 (1981).
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cred trust."15 In part, the notion of a unique, confidential physician-
patient relationship reflects organized medicine's long-standing oppo-
sition to third party involvement in the delivery of care, whether the
third party is an indemnity insurer, a governmental regulator or
payor, or, more recently, a managed care organization.16
The concept of a fiduciary involves two key elements: superior
knowledge, skill, and experience by one party, and the obligation of
that party to use that expertise for the benefit of the other on whose
behalf the fiduciary is acting, and not act out of self-interest.17 All
definitions of fiduciary also recognize that the relationship is founded
on the trust that one party places on the other, and that the fiduciary
must act with good faith and candor.1S Classic examples of fiduciary
obligations include the physician-patient, attorney-client, guardian
and ward, executor and heir, and trustee and beneficiary relation-
ships.19 Statutes employing the concept of fiduciary have built on its
common law definition, leading to very specialized rules of fiduciary
obligation for particular statutes.20
15. Jonas writes:
In the course of treatment, the physician is obligated to the patient and
to no one else. He is not the agent of society, nor of the interests of medi-
cal science, nor of the patient's family.... The physician is bound not to
let any other interest interfere with that of the patient in being
cured .... We may speak of a sacred trust; strictly by its terms, the
doctor is, as it were, alone with his patient and God.
HANS JONAS, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects,
in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHIcs 432, 438 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy
Walters eds., 3d ed. 1978), cited by William M. Sage, Physicians as Advocates, 35
HOUSTON L. REV. 1529, 1531 (1999).
16. For early statements of this viewpoint, see American Medical Association (AMA),
Sickness Insurance Problems in the United States, June 30, 1934 (adopted in
response to the 1932 report of the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, or-
ganized by the Carnegie Foundation to evaluate health and medical services in
the United States), cited in ANNAS ET AL., supra note 13, at 16-17. The principles
announced by the AMA in its report include the following:
Second: No third party must be permitted to come between the patient
and his physician in any medical relation. All responsibility for the char-
actor of medical service must be borne by the profession.... Fourth: The
method of giving the service must retain a permanent, confidential rela-
tion between the patient and a "family physician." This relation must be
the fundamental and dominating feature of any system. . . . Tenth:
There should be no restrictions on treatment or prescribing not formu-
lated and enforced by the organized medical profession.
17. See, e.g., the interchange between Marlon Brando and Rod Steiger in Elia Ka-
zan's movie, ON THE WATERFRONT, supra note 1.
18. Id.
19. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
20. See, e.g., ERISA § 4402, 29 U.S.C. § 1461 (2003), in which the obligations of an
ERISA plan fiduciary have undergone continuing revision in Supreme Court de-
cisions, such as Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996) and Pegram v. Her-
drich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
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B. Health Care Professionals' Viewpoint
The American Medical Association (AMA) has embraced this con-
cept of fiduciary obligation in several official pronouncements. 2 1
First, in a set of principles focusing on the "Fundamental Elements of
the Patient-Physician Relationship," the AMA emphasizes that physi-
cians can contribute to a collaborative, "mutually respectful [physi-
cian-patient relationship] . . . by serving as their patients'
advocates." 2 2 In an Opinion of its Council on Ethical and Judicial Af-
fairs directed explicitly at managed care, the AMA declares that, "The
duty of patient advocacy is a fundamental element of the patient-phy-
sician relationship that should not be altered by the system of health
care delivery. Physicians must continue to place the interests of their
patients first."23 The Opinion requires physicians to act as advocates
for their patients, both in individual cases and in the development of
broad allocation and clinical practice guidelines. In regard to individ-
ual treatment decisions, physicians are adjured to act as a patient ad-
vocate to challenge a denial of care that the physician believes will
materially benefit the patient,24 and are even mandated to initiate ap-
peals on behalf of their patients in certain circumstances. 25 The Opin-
21. Other health care professions also recognize an ethical obligation to advocate for
patients. See, e.g., CODE OF ETHICS FOR NURSES WITH INTERPRETATIVE STATE-
MENTS 3 (American Nurses Association 2001) (providing that "[tihe nurse pro-
motes, advocates for, and strives to protect the health, safety, and rights of the
patient").
22. AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Code of Medical Ethics: Ethical
Opinion E-10.01 (July 31, 2002), available at http://www.ama-assn.orglama/pub/
category/2498.html. The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA) main-
tains and updates the 155-year-old AMA Code of Medical Ethics, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org, which is considered by many to be a comprehensive
ethics guide for physicians. The CEJA renders opinions concerning the interpre-
tation or application of the constitution, bylaws, rules, or principles of medical
ethics of the American Medical Association. Available at http://www.ama-assn.
orglama/pub/article/4325-4427.html.
23. AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Code of Medical Ethics: Ethical
Opinion E-8.13(1) (June 2002) (Managed Care), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/2498.html.
24. For instance, id. at section (2) provides: "When health care plans place restric-
tions on the care that physicians in the plan may provide to their patients, [the]
following principles should be followed: ... (b) Regardless of any allocation guide-
lines or gatekeeper directives, physicians must advocate for any care they believe
will materially benefit their patients."
25. Specifically, id. at section (2)(d) provides:
Adequate appellate mechanisms for both patients and physicians should
be in place to address disputes regarding medically necessary care. In
some circumstances, physicians have an obligation to initiate appeals on
behalf of their patients. Cases may arise in which a health plan has an
allocation guideline that is generally fair but in particular circumstances
results in unfair denials of care, i.e., denial of care that, in the physi-
cian's judgment, would materially benefit the patient. In such cases, the
physician's duty as patient advocate requires that the physician chal-
2003]
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ion also emphasizes the need for physicians to work with managed
care plans to develop broad resource allocation guidelines that will be
"sensitive to differences among patients," so that physicians will not
have to "engage in bedside rationing."26 At the same time, in recogni-
tion of the potential distorting effect of the financial incentives pro-
vided by different reimbursement mechanisms, the AMA stresses that
physicians' first obligations are to their individual patients.2 7
C. Common Law Views on Health Care Professionals' Duty
to Advocate
The cases are few and far between. Some cases recognize that phy-
sicians and other health care providers have a fiduciary duty to their
patients that includes advocating for medically necessary care and
emphasize that the physician (or other HCP with primary patient re-
sponsibilities) is the only person who can effectively perform this func-
tion. In Wickline v. California,28 a landmark case decided in 1986,29
lenge the denial and argue for the provision of treatment in the specific
case. Cases may also arise when a health plan has an allocation guide-
line that is generally unfair in its operations. In such cases, the physi-
cian's duty as patient advocate requires not only a challenge to any
denials of treatment from the guideline but also advocacy at the health
plan's policy-making level to seek an elimination or modification of the
guideline. Physicians should assist patients who wish to seek addi-
tional, appropriate care outside the plan when the physician believes the
care is in the patient's best interests.
26. Again, id. at sections (2)(a) and (c) provide:
(a) Any broad allocation guidelines that restrict care and choices - which
go beyond the cost/benefit judgments made by physicians as a part of
their normal professional responsibilities - should be established at a
policy making level so that individual physicians are not asked to engage
in bedside rationing.
(c) Physicians should be given an active role in contributing their exper-
tise to any allocation process and should advocate for guidelines that are
sensitive to differences among patients. Health care plans should create
structures similar to hospital medical staffs that allow physicians to
have meaningful input into the plan's development of allocation
guidelines.
27. See, e.g., AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Code of Medical Ethics:
Ethical Opinion E-8.054 (June 2002) (Financial Incentives and the Practice of
Medicine), available at http://www.ama-assn.orglama/pub/category/2498.html.
Specifically, id. provides:
In order to achieve the necessary goals of patient care and to protect the
role of physicians as advocates for individual patients, the following
statement is offered for the guidance of physicians: (1) Although physi-
cians have an obligation to consider the needs of broader patient popula-
tions within the context of the patient-physician relationship, their first
duty must be to the individual patient. This obligation must override
considerations of the reimbursement mechanism or specific financial in-
centives applied to a physician's clinical practice.
28. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. App. 1986).
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an indigent patient, Lois Wickline, claimed that Medi-Cal, the Califor-
nia Medicaid program, employed an oppressive prospective utilization
review process that led to severe injuries when she was discharged
prematurely from the hospital following surgery to relieve arterioscle-
rosis in her leg Due to infection and loss of circulation in Wickline's
leg that the doctors had not been able to observe because she was not
in the hospital, her leg became gangrenous and had to be amputated.
Wickline argued that Medi-Cal was responsible for the amputation,
because her doctors had been intimidated by Medi-Cal's prospective
utilization review process and therefore did not contest the discharge
decreed by Medi-Cal. The California Court of Appeals disagreed on
the facts, finding that Medi-Cal was not liable because Mrs. Wickline's
physicians had not fulfilled their duty to adequately communicate the
reasons why a longer hospitalization was necessary, which would have
put Medi-Cal on notice about their concerns and permitted them to
authorize a further stay. The court observed, "[Tihe physician who
complies without protest with the limitations imposed by a third party
payor, when his medical judgment dictates otherwise, cannot avoid
his ultimate responsibility for his patient's care[,]"30 but, importantly,
the court emphasized that "cost limitation programs [should] not be
permitted to corrupt medical judgment. "31
The California Supreme Court did later explicitly recognize physi-
cians' fiduciary duties to their patients. In Moore v. Regents of the
University of California,3 2 the Court considered a suit based on the
alleged removal of a patient's spleen for economic gain. John Moore's
physician removed his spleen, ostensibly to treat Moore's leukemia.
However, Moore alleged that the physician's goal in moving the spleen
was to obtain its potentially valuable "cell line," and that the doctor
had failed to disclose his financial interest to the patient. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court rejected Moore's suit for conversion, but found that
he did state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and lack of
informed consent, holding that:
a physician must disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's health,
whether research or economic, that may affect the physician's professional
judgment; and (2) a physician's failure to disclose such interests may give rise
to a cause of action for performing medical procedures without informed con-
sent or breach of fiduciary duty.
3 3
This duty to disclose conflicts of interest is relevant to the duty to ad-
vocate in the managed care context. Under a fee for service health
care system, there is a financial incentive to over-treat, because health
29. Wickline was cited by the California Legislature in its advocacy protection stat-
ute, discussed infra in Part IV.
30. 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
31. Id. at 820.
32. 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990).
33. Id. at 150.
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care professionals are paid on a per-procedure basis.3 4 Under a man-
aged care system, the physician is given incentives to "manage" care 35
carefully, by making sure that only medically necessary care is pro-
vided.36 Primary care physicians serve as "gatekeepers" through their
ability to refer patients for appropriate services with hospitals, diag-
nostic tests, and other health care professionals. Capitation, with-
holds, and other financial incentives in the HCPs' contracts are
designed to induce them to only offer care that is clearly medically
indicated, and there is thus the potential for under-treatment. 3 7 The
duty to disclose potential financial conflicts of interest has been recog-
nized by other courts as well,38 although there is not universal agree-
ment on who must do the disclosing. 3 9 Indeed, some commentators
34. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 218 (2000); see also AMA Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs, Code of Medical Ethics: Ethical Opinion E-8.054 (June 2002)
(Financial Incentives and the Practice of Medicine) (addressing the incentive to
overtreat created by fee for service medicine), available at http://www.ama-assn.
org/ama/pub/category/2498.html.
35. Most managed care plans emphasize the provision of preventative care, including
immunizations and age-appropriate screening tests. MCO physicians also ar-
range for diagnostic, acute, and chronic care services for their patients.
36. Indeed, in the 1990's managed care plans moved from reliance on utilization re-
view as the primary mode of cost containment to a strategy of providing incen-
tives to HCPs for cost containment that "moved rationing responsibilities from
the health plan to the health provider .. " BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW
496-97 (2d ed. 2000).
37. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 219 (2000). These incentives can often be quite complicated.
For example, "[I]n multiple-tier arrangements, the health plan reimburses the
physician group in one way and the physician group reimburses the physician
with incentives that may be entirely different." Tracy E. Miller & Carol R.
Horowitz, Disclosing Doctors' Incentives: Will Consumers Understand and Value
the Information? 19 HEALTH AFF. 149, 150 (2000) [hereinafter Disclosing Doctors'
Incentives]. Significantly, it has been found that MCO financial incentives to
HCPS and utilization review processes had a greater impact on treatment availa-
bility than did contractually based coverage denials. FURROW ET AL., supra note
36, at 437 n.10 (citing Peter D. Jacobsen et al., Defining and Implementing Medi-
cal Necessity in Washington State and Oregon, 34 INQUIRY 143, 148 (1997)).
38. See, e.g., Shea v. Esensten, 208 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 2000) (permitting plaintiff to go
forward with a claim of negligent misrepresentation based on a treating physi-
cian's failure to disclose to a patient that the doctor's payment arrangements
with a MCO gave him a financial incentive not to refer patients to specialists).
39. Thus, in Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496 (Ill. 2000), the Illinois Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff could not bring causes of action for both medical malpractice,
based on a failure to diagnose the plaintiffs husband's coronary condition (a diag-
nosis that might have been made had the physician referred the husband for an
angiogram) and for breach of fiduciary duty, based on the physician's failure to
disclose his financial incentives to limit diagnostic and medical procedures (in-
cluding angiograms) as part of his arrangement with the MCO. The court ob-
served that because an Illinois statute provided that health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) must disclose their financial incentives structure to en-
rolled patients, the Illinois legislature had decided that physicians did not have
an independent duty to disclose their financial arrangements.
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have suggested that consumers have a hard time understanding phy-
sician incentives, and thus, that even though disclosure is appropri-
ate, it may lead to consumers' confusion and a decrease in their trust
for physicians. 40
Courts outside of California have also endorsed the principle that
health care professionals have a fiduciary duty to advocate for pa-
tients in their interactions with insurers and managed care organiza-
tions. In Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare Versalite Plus HMO,41 the New
York Court of Appeals implicitly recognized that physicians have a
fiduciary duty to advocate for their patients by expeditiously referring
them to a specialist when their symptoms warrant it. In that case, a
patient was forced to switch managed care plans when his employer
changed plans. He spent several weeks pursuing appointments with
his new primary care physician, and further weeks seeking a referral
to a cardiac specialist. Ultimately, the patient died of a massive heart
attack the morning of his scheduled appointment with the specialist.
The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs medical malpractice and
breach of fiduciary duty claims against a primary care physician were
not preempted by ERISA, and thus let the claim for breach of fiduci-
ary duty go forward. In Murphy v. Godwin,42 the Delaware Superior
Court ruled that plaintiffs could proceed in their claim against a phy-
sician for failing to fill out the short form necessary to obtain insur-
ance, holding that when " a doctor-patient relationship is shown to
exist, it must... [give] rise to a duty of reasonable care [in regard to
filling out the form]."43
However, not all courts have agreed that health care professionals
have a fiduciary duty to advocate for patients. In Pryzbowski v. U.S.
Healthcare Inc.,4a the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that New
Jersey state courts had not recognized the fiduciary duty to advocate
on behalf of patients to an HMO for the timely approval of benefits.4 5
D. Advocacy - A Problem of Definitions
The question of what is meant by the term "patient advocacy" is
critical to understanding the clinical and legal impact of state advo-
cacy protection laws. The question of HCP advocacy arises primarily
in a managed care context, in which concurrent and prospective utili-
40. Disclosing Doctors' Incentives, supra note 37.
41. 711 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 1999).
42. 303 A.2d 668 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973).
43. Id. at 674 (ruling on a motion for summary judgment).
44. 245 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2001).
45. Interestingly, the Medical Society of New Jersey had submitted an amicus brief
urging the court not to find such a duty. Id. at 281-82. This submission was, of
course, at odds with the AMA's position that patient advocacy is an essential part
of the physician's obligations to the patient. See AMA Opinion 8.13, supra note
23.
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zation review, as well as HCP incentives, can result in denial of
care. 4 6 A variety of scenarios can be envisioned in which health care
professionals may believe that they are ethically obligated to fight for
a particular treatment, while a managed care organization may view
such conduct as "obstructionism," an unwillingness to "get with the
program" of managed care, or the health professional's acting out of a
vested personal or financial interest. The following scenarios indicate
the range of potentially disputed activity:
(1) A health care professional treats a potentially suicidal patient in a hospital
emergency room and determines that the person needs to be admitted to the
hospital. Is it protected patient advocacy to argue with the patient's MCO
that immediate admission to the hospital is medically necessary and
appropriate?
4 7
(2) When an emergency room physician determines that a patient needs an
emergency diagnostic procedure, which can best be provided at a specialized
tertiary care center which is not part of the MCO network, and the MCO de-
nies pre-authorization to be transferred to the recommended tertiary care
center, is the physician who argues with the HMO engaging in protected pa-
tient advocacy? If so, how long must the physician continue to argue with the
MCO before the fiduciary obligation to the patient is satisfied?4 8
(3)(a) Is it protected patient advocacy or an unwillingness to accept the basic
premise of managed care for a primary care physician to insist on making a
referral to an out-of-network specialist whom she believes can best evaluate
and treat the patient's symptoms? How rare or serious does the suspected
46. See, e.g., Wickline v. California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 810 (Cal. App. 1986); AMA
Opinion 8.13, supra note 23; FURROW ET AL., supra note 36. In contrast, under a
fee-for-service system, HCPs are not generally called upon to engage in advocacy,
because the health care payor, usually an indemnity insurance company, will re-
imburse patients for all "medically necessary" services recommended or per-
formed by the HCP. In addition, in many fee-for service systems, health care
services are first provided to the patients and disputes about medical necessity
arise only after the fact. See, e.g., Sarchett v. Blue Shield, 233 Cal. Rptr. 76 (Cal.
1987).
47. See, e.g., Wagner v. Magellan Health Servs., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 673 (N.D. Ill.
2000); Wagner v. Magellan Health Servs., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 302 (N.D. Ill.
2000); see also Wagner v. Magellan Health Servs., Inc., Case No. 01 L225 (Cir. Ct.
for 19th Judic Cir., Lake County, Ill.) (currently pending).
48. Cf. Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2001) (Pappas II) (affirming its original
decision in Pappas v. Asbel, 724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998) (Pappas I) (holding that
ERISA did not preempt state law malpractice claim against HMO physicians
where consultation with HMO caused an inordinate delay that resulted in harm
to patient)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Pappas II on remand
from the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari, sub nom U.S. Healthcare System of
Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Hospital Insurance Co., 530 U.S. 1241 (2000),
which simultaneously granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded
the case to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for further consideration in light of
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000), decided the previous week. See also
Miller v. HealthAmerica Pa. Inc., 50 Pa. D. & C.4th 1 (2000) (overruling HMO's
objection that plaintiffs claim was preempted by ERISA where hospital imposed
such heavy workloads on physicians that they were unable to properly monitor
patients).
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disease or condition have to be? What if the MCO has contracts with at least
half of the "best" specialists within the area?
(3)(b) Is it protected patient advocacy for a pediatrician to decline to send a
two week old infant with a high fever to an off-premises clinical laboratory
that is under contract with the infant's MCO, when sending the child there
will delay diagnosis, and therefore treatment, by more than a day and the
pediatrician could perform the test in the office and get the results back
within several hours?
(4) Is it protected patient advocacy when a patient presents with symptoms
indicating possible coronary problems for the HCP to urge the patient's MCO
to put the patient at the head of the queue, because of the urgent nature of his
condition? How much time/effort must the HCP expend to satisfy this fiduci-
ary obligation? 4
9
(5) Is it protected patient advocacy for a HCP to argue with the patient's MCO
to continue to authorize hospitalization after a patient has been in the hospi-
tal longer than the time normally expected for the particular medical condi-
tion/DRG, if the HCP can demonstrate that a longer hospitalization is
necessary and appropriate?5 0
(6) Is it protected patient advocacy for a physician to write to the MCO com-
plaining that its reimbursement rates were less than the costs of providing
care and suggesting that the MCO was systematically limiting patient access
to timely and appropriate care? Or, is the MCO justified in terminating the
physician on the ground that dissatisfied providers do not provide good pa-
tient care?
5 1
(7) Is it protected patient advocacy for an anesthesiologist who believes that a
patient scheduled for surgery is medically unstable to refuse to administer
anesthesia, thus precluding the surgery?5 2
(8) Is it protected patient advocacy for an orthopedic surgeon to argue that the
patient's back pain should be treated by orthopedic surgery rather than the
neurosurgery recommended by the patient's MCO's medical director? 5 3 What
if the doctor and the hospital would require the patient to sign an informed
consent form acknowledging that the surgery is experimental in order to ob-
tain the surgery?5 4
49. Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare Versalite Plus HMO, 711 N.E.2d 621, 621 (N.Y. 1999).
50. See, e.g., Wickline v. California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 810 (Cal. App. 1986).
51. See David R. Olmos & Michael A. Hiltzik, Doctors' Authority, Pay Dwindles
Under HMO, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1995, at Al; see also Woolhandler, supra note 3
(stating that a doctor who complained publicly that his HMO's risk-sharing and
financial incentive arrangements lead directly to a lower quality of care for pa-
tients was terminated without cause).
52. Khajavi v. Feather River Anesthesia Med. Group, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 (Ct. App.
2000).
53. Cf Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) (holding that state
statue requiring HMOs to provide independent medical review of disputes be-
tween primary care physician and HMO and to cover services deemed medically
necessary by independent reviewer was not preempted by ERISA), with Lewis v.
Individual Practice Ass'n, Inc., 723 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 2001) (authorizing dis-
covery into whether physician's employment contract was not renewed because
he had participated in patient advocacy).
54. See Bradley v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 562 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sup. Ct.
1990) (granting terminally ill plaintiffs motion to enjoin his insurer from refus-
ing to cover procedure because it was excluded from coverage as "experimental or
investigative").
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These scenarios, drawn largely from actual cases, sketch the land-
scape where the current argument over the meaning and limits of le-
gally protected patient advocacy is being played out. Next, we turn to
the data.
E. How Common Is Health Care Professional Deselection?
There is considerable disagreement about the extent to which man-
aged care organizations terminate or fail to renew their contractual
relationships with health care professionals because of these profes-
sionals' advocacy. There are many reasons why an HCP's contract
with an MCO might not be renewed, some appropriate and some not.
Appropriate reasons include concerns about an HCP's professional
competence, including issues of board certification, pending discipli-
nary or malpractice actions, as well as sexual harassment or other im-
proper conduct. MCOs have a substantial incentive to make sure that
the records of participating HCPs are "squeaky-clean," as more and
more courts are holding MCOs vicariously liable for the negligence of
network HCPs,55 and MCOs are increasingly seen as "deep pocket"
defendants. Apart from liability concerns, MCOs also have important
business and economic grounds for parting company with HCPs, in-
cluding the use of more primary care and fewer specialist physicians
as part of their "gatekeeping" strategy. 56 In addition, broad changes
in national and local health care markets, such as the evolving medi-
cal needs of MCO enrollees and the need to reconfigure relationships
with hospitals, can lead MCOs to deselect HCPs who no longer meet
their needs. One gray area which has emerged is whether it is appro-
priate to deselect HCPs due to their overutilization of diagnostic, spe-
cialist, and inpatient resources, particularly if these services are
provided out of network. Questions about whether certain procedures
are medically necessary and appropriate frequently arise.57 Although
an MCO's motive in questioning the necessity of certain procedures
may be to cut costs, it is also true that many patients receive medi-
cally unnecessary care, which can be merely unhelpful or actively
harmful, with innovative medical treatment providing a classic case in
point.5 8 On the other hand, some HCPs and their lawyers charge that
MCOs deselect HCPs not for negligent or otherwise inappropriate
care, but because the HCPs push too hard for care for their patients or
challenge MCO policies, particularly in public.
55. In the 1990s, MCOs are increasingly taking on the role that hospitals had in an
earlier era, in terms of credentialing and otherwise vouching for the quality of
care provided by their physicians.
56. See, e.g., Olmos & Hiltzik, supra note 51.
57. See Foong v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 2003 WL 21234956 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2003).
58. See Bradley, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
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In part, the disparity of views between HCPs and MCOs can be
attributed to terminology. As noted in the scenarios posited above,
one person's patient advocacy may be another person's not "getting
with the program" of managed care, or making a recommendation that
is medically unsound or acting out of a vested financial self-interest. 5 9
But beyond this obvious opportunity for different perceptions about
what constitutes appropriate patient advocacy, there appears to be a
powerful disconnect between the experiences reported by managed
care officials compared to those of health care professionals. For ex-
ample, one lawyer for a large managed care entity has stated that
HCPs were almost never terminated from that MCO because of advo-
cacy, since the MCO's contract with its physicians affirmatively en-
couraged them to advocate on their patients' behalf.60
In contrast, media accounts are replete with stories of physicians
who were terminated from MCOs, either because they complained
generally about lowered quality of patient care or because they made
too many out-of-network referrals. 6 1 Lawyers for physicians who
have been deselected from MCOs have frequently stated that their cli-
ents' contracts with an MCO were terminated or not renewed after
protracted wrangling with the MCO over either patient-specific or
broader patient care issues.62 These included MCO refusals to au-
thorize recommended procedures for their patients (including emer-
gency hospital admissions), MCO failures to collaborate with
physicians in establishing clinical practice guidelines, or MCO insis-
59. As Bill Sage has observed, "[jiust because one physician desires to provide treat-
ment to a patient does not automatically confer legitimacy on that physician as
advocate to the exclusion of others." William M. Sage, Physicians as Advocates,
35 Hous. L. REV. 1529, 1569 (1999).
60. The contract for physician specialists at one large MCO provides, in pertinent
part:
Nothing in this Agreement or the Policies should be construed to pro-
hibit, limit or restrict you from advocating on behalf of your patients or
providing information, letters of support to, or assistance consistent with
the health care needs of your patients and your professional responsibil-
ity, conscience, medical knowledge, license and applicable law. In fact,
we encourage you to discuss with your patients all pertinent details re-
garding their condition and all care alternatives, including potential
risks and benefits, even if a care option is not covered. We also en-
courage you to discuss your compensation arrangements hereunder with
your patients. Nothing in this Agreement or the Policies should be con-
strued to create any right of Company or any Payor to intervene in the
manner, methods or means by which you render health care services to
your patients.
Physician Specialist Contract (copy on file with the author).
61. See, e.g., Olmos & Hiltzik, supra note 51; Glenn Singer, HMO Action Draws In-
quiry, State Studies Termination of Pediatrician, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July 24,
2001, at 1D.
62. Although no specific date is available, this information has been gathered over
several conversations with the author.
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tence on cost-containment procedures which the physicians believed
put their patients at risk.6 3 These attorneys also related stories about
other HCPs whom they said were afraid to confront MCOs over such
issues as utilization review, denials of necessary care, pressures to
limit prescriptions for expensive pharmaceuticals, and a variety of
other cost-containment measures, and suggested that at least some
MCOs used the threat of contract termination to keep HCPs in check.
The economic pressure on physicians to comply with MCO cost con-
tainment and utilization review policies has been well documented. In
Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,6 4 the California Supreme
Court discussed the large number of articles and authorities asserting
that managed care organizations operating in California held "sub-
stantial economic power" over both physicians and patients in that
state, which made "access to provider panels a 'practical prerequisite'
to any effective practice as a health care provider."6 5 While the au-
thors of the 1997 GAO Gag Clause Report 6 6 found no explicit gag
clause in any of the more than 1,100 managed care contracts they re-
viewed, they did find that "non-disparagement clauses" were widely
used by the MCOs to "protect a plan's business interests by requiring
that physicians dissatisfied with an HMO complain to the HMO and
63. This last category is, of course, huge and open-ended, since it encompasses most,
if not all, of the clinical and ideological disagreements between physicians and
MCOs. In one litigated case, a physician claimed that he was terminated by his
MCO after challenging the MCO's proposed new policy of requiring physicians to
transfer care of their hospitalized patients to an MCO physician who lacked any
previous relationship with the patient, but who presumably would adhere more
readily to the MCO's discharge guidelines. A jury awarded him $4 million in
compensatory damages and $15 million in punitive damages. Guy H. Lawrence,
Jury Awards $15 Million in Punitive Damages to Local Physician Visit .... ,
CALLER-TIMES (Corpus Christi, Tex.), Nov. 18, 2000, at B1; see also Singer, supra
note 61.
64. 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496 (Cal. 2000).
65. Id. at 504-05.
66. See GAO GAG CLAUSE REPORT, supra note 5. The Report concluded:
Many physicians and attorneys believe that the most powerful incentive
for a physician to cooperate with HMO policies on physician-patient com-
munication is the possibility that his or her contract could be canceled.
Of the contracts that we reviewed for this study, nearly all were initially
written for a period of 1 year or less, and were renewable for 1-year peri-
ods. To the extent that the plan threatens the economic well-being of
those ignoring its contract provisions, physicians may feel forced to be
more compliant. One means HMOs have for enforcing physician adher-
ence to plan policies, procedures, and utilization management guidelines
is the "without cause" or "at-will" termination clause, which we found in
72 percent of the HMO contracts we reviewed.... Physicians also told
us that the termination clause becomes especially important in regions
where the health care marketplace is dominated by a few large managed
care plans. In this situation, physicians may be less willing to challenge
HMO policies because they view their participation in managed care
plans as essential to sustain their practice.
Id. at 14-15.
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not to the patient."67 The Report observed that physicians could inter-
pret these clauses as limiting or precluding communications with pa-
tients about treatment options, financial incentives, or other MCO
cost containment mechanisms, although they expressed some doubt
that many physicians actually read their contracts carefully enough to
be intimidated by these clauses. However, the Report noted that for
many physicians, the threat of termination or nonrenewal of their con-
tract was a powerful inducement for them to comply with the policies
and practices of the MCO, whether written or unwritten. Thus, the in
terrorem impact of MCO contracts, with their short terms and the pos-
sibility of terminations "at-will" or "without cause," likely has a
profound effect on the way HCPs deliver health care and advocate for
their patients, despite contracts which are formally neutral, or even
supportive of patient advocacy.
F. National Health Care Professional Data Banks
Yet acknowledging the psychological and economic power of
MCOs68 vis d vis HCPs and patients is only the first step toward un-
derstanding the reality of HCP-MCO relations. There are very limited
data available, apart from news stories or individual anecdotes, to in-
dicate the frequency of HCP deselection from MCOs, either for advo-
cacy or other reasons. Although there are two major national
information sources for actions taken against physicians and other
health care professionals - the National Practitioner Data Bank
(NPDB) and the Healthcare Integrity and Protection Data Bank
(HIPDB)69 - neither data bank provides much information about MCO
67. Id. at 6.
68. Of course, whether or not an MCO has the upper hand in negotiating and enforc-
ing a contract with HCPs depends considerably on the concentration and power of
that MCO and MCOs generally in a particular geographic health care market-
place. Id. at 14-15.
69. Congress established these two entities with the goal of creating a nationwide
data base concerning all HCPs who have had their professional competence or
honesty called into question, so that state licensing boards, hospitals, and health
plans, among others, can make better disciplinary and credentialing decisions.
Both data banks are authorized to collect and release data concerning health care
professional performance. These data are available to the public only in aggre-
gate form, which precludes the public (and research scholars) from knowing what
actions have been taken against individual HCPs, and why the actions were
taken. The NPDB was established as part of the Health Care Quality Improve-
ment Act of 1986 (HCQIA), Title IV of Pub. L. 99-660, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11131-11137 (2000), a multi-faceted effort to improve the quality of health
care. By providing antitrust immunity for physicians who participate in peer re-
view activities, the HCQIA encourages them to engage in peer review and other
disciplinary actions against incompetent or negligent health care professionals.
In addition, the HCQIA established the NPDB, a national clearinghouse for infor-
mation about incompetent HCPs, thus limiting these HCPs' ability to move from
state to state and continue to practice their profession even after disciplinary
20031
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terminations of HCPs. Health plans7 0 reported 410 contract termina-
tions of HCPs, primarily physicians and dentists, to the HIPDB, cov-
ering the period from August 1996 through the end of 2000.71
The significance of these contract terminations is unclear, because
of an inadequate context in which to interpret the meaning of the
data. One can speculate that all these cases involved providers
deemed so problematic by their health plans that it was felt necessary
to terminate their contract before the end of its term, usually a year or
less. 72 It is impossible to know why the HCPs were terminated by the
health plans, since no reason need be given in the report. Since the
only terminations that must be reported are those in which due pro-
cess procedures were utilized, we do know that in every one of these
cases, the providers objected to their termination and challenged it
through an adversarial due process proceeding.7 3 What we do not
action has been taken against them in another state. Actions that must be re-
ported to the NPDB include state disciplinary actions against physicians or den-
tists relating to that person's professional competence or conduct; adverse HCP
clinical privileges decisions made by hospitals and other health care entities, in-
cluding HMOs and professional societies; exclusions of HCPs from the Medicare
and Medicaid programs; Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) actions to re-
voke the registration of a HCP (i.e. the ability to write prescriptions), and; all
medical malpractice awards paid by anyone other than the HCP himself (i.e., a
malpractice insurer; medical group, or hospital). See generally NATIONAL PRACTI-
TIONER DATA BANK, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 2-6 (2000), available at http://www.
npdb-hipdb.com/annualrpt.html.
Congress authorized the Healthcare Integrity and Protection Data Bank
(HIPDB) in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA), as part of a massive federal initiative to combat health care fraud and
abuse. HIPDB's goal is to "flag" HCPs who have engaged in fraudulent or im-
proper billing for health care services, so that "queriers" may know whether a
particular HCP has allegedly engaged in fraudulent activity. Among the "adjudi-
cated actions or decisions" which must be reported to the HIPDB are: state and
federal licensing and certification decisions; health care-related civil judgments
and criminal convictions; injunctions related to the delivery of a health care item
or service, exclusions from participation in Medicare, Medicaid, and other state or
federal health care programs; and any other adverse action taken by a private
entity, including contract terminations made by health plans. HEALTHCARE IN-
TEGRITY AND PROTECTION DATA BANK, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2000).
70. Health plans include MCOs and insurers.
71. This apparent time anomaly is due to the requirements of HIPAA, the statute
which authorized the formation of the HIPDB. Although the HIPDB did not be-
come operational until November 1999, HIPAA requires that all reporters com-
municate "adverse events" and other mandated actions dating back to August 21,
1996, the date the statute was enacted. HEALTHCARE INTEGRITY AND PROTECTION
DATA BANK, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 1-2, 8.
72. See GAO GAG CLAUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 14-15.
73. There is some anecdotal evidence from health care lawyers working in this area
that health plans and other entities may be underreporting the adverse actions
they have taken against health care professionals, because of a lack of informa-
tion or understanding about which procedures meet these due process standards,
and thus must be reported.
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know is how many health plans decided to wait until the HCP's con-
tract expired at the end of its term, and simply chose not to renew it.
Finally, we have no estimate of the costs, to individual health care
professionals and their patients (through a loss of continuity of care),
of the deselection of those HCPs from an MCO. In Potvin v. Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Co., 7 4 a physician who was terminated from a
HMO's preferred provider network alleged that because he was obli-
gated to report Met Life's termination of his contract, other HMO's
also terminated their contractual agreements with him, leading to a
loss of patient referrals, and therefore income. Specialists, like the
obstetrician-gynecologist Dr. Potvin, are particularly vulnerable to
deselection, since most MCOs rely on a gatekeeping system, in which
all patient treatment is funneled through a single primary care physi-
cian who coordinates care through referrals.7 5
IV. STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW PROTECTIONS FOR
HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS WHO ADVOCATE
FOR THEIR PATIENTS
A. Legislative Action
1. Explicit Protection of Advocacy
Seventeen states have adopted laws explicitly protecting health
care professionals against retaliation due to their advocacy on behalf
of patients. In 1993, California launched this trend, as it has done so
many other times in health care, enacting a statute that broadly pro-
motes patient advocacy. The statutory preamble 76 declares that phy-
74. 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496 (2000).
75. Olmos & Hiltzik, supra note 51. Indeed, the need for a MCO to be able to effec-
tively "manage" care, by choosing only those HCPs who understand its philoso-
phy of rationalizing care and expenditures, is one reason that MCOs object so
strenuously to Any Willing Provider Laws, discussed in text accompanying notes
123-26 infra.
76. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2056 (West 2003) provides "protection against retalia-
tion for physicians who advocate for medically appropriate health care" and de-
clares that:
(a) The purpose of this section is to provide protection against retaliation
for physicians who advocate for medically appropriate health care for
their patients pursuant to Wickline v. California, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630.
(b) It is the public policy of the State of California that a physician and
surgeon be encouraged to advocate for medically appropriate health care
for his or her patients. For purposes of this section, "to advocate for med-
ically appropriate health care" means to appeal a payor's decision to
deny payment for a service pursuant to the reasonable grievance or ap-
peal procedure established by a medical group, independent practice as-
sociation, preferred provider organization, foundation, hospital medical
staff and governing body, or payer, or to protest a decision, policy, or
practice that the physician, consistent with that degree of learning and
skill ordinarily possessed by reputable physicians practicing according to
'the applicable legal standard of care, reasonably believes impairs the
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sicians who engage in advocacy a la Wickline77 are protected from
retaliation, and announces that it is the public policy of California
that "physician[s] and surgeon[s] . .. be encouraged to advocate for
medically appropriate health care for ... [their] patients."78
Over the next ten years, sixteen more states followed California's
lead. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Louisi-
ana, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Or-
egon, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee have each enacted laws that
explicitly protect health care professionals from retaliation due to pa-
tient advocacy 7 9 by a managed care organization or other payor.SO
These laws vary widely in their definitions of protected advocacy, the
scope of their coverage, and the form that the statutory mandate
takes. None of the statutes spells out precisely what will happen if an
HCP is penalized for engaging in protected advocacy.8 1
physician's ability to provide medically appropriate health care to his or
her patients.
(c) The application and rendering by any person of a decision to termi-
nate an employment or other contractual relationship with, or otherwise
penalize, a physician and surgeon principally for advocating for medi-
cally appropriate health care consistent with that degree of learning and
skill ordinarily possessed by reputable physicians practicing according to
the applicable legal standard of care violates the public policy of this
state. No person shall terminate, retaliate against, or otherwise penal-
ize a physician and surgeon for that advocacy, nor shall any person pro-
hibit, restrict, or in any way discourage a physician and surgeon from
communicating to a patient information in furtherance of medically ap-
propriate health care.
77. Wickline v. California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 810 (App. 1986).
78. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE §2056(b) (West 2003). Under California law, courts are
limited to finding a public policy in statutes and constitutional provisions.
79. ALASKA STAT. § 21.07.010(a)(5) (2002); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 20-827(B) (2003); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 10-16-121 (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 38a-478(c) (1999) and 38a-
503d(b) (1997); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 134/35 (2001); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 27-13-10-
11 and 27-8-28-18 (Ind. 1999 Replacement & 2000 Supp.); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 22:215.18 (2003 Supp.); ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A § 4303 (2000); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 354.609 (2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-J: 8 VIII (2000); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 4406-d(5) (McKinney 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-04-03(18)
(2003); OR. REV. STAT. §743.803(f) (2001); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 991.2113(c)
(2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-32-230 (2001). While most of these statutes protect
all health care professionals, California protects only physicians. See CAL Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 2056 (1996).
80. Most statutes direct their sanctions against HMOs or MCOs, but some include
insurance companies as well. The California statute is even broader, granting
physicians protection against retaliation by any "person." CAL Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 2056(c).
81. Of course, a failure to articulate a precise sanction for noncompliance is not un-
common. However, it does raise the question, discussed infra in Part V, about
what enforcement mechanisms are available to HCPs who seek to challenge their
deselection from an MCO on advocacy grounds.
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Several statutes provide protection for advocacy without defining
that term,8 2 while other statutes specify those actions that constitute
protected advocacy. Maine, for example, prohibits carriers offering
managed care plans from "terminat[ing] or otherwise disciplin[ing] a
participating provider because the provider advocates for medically
appropriate health care."8 3 The statute then offers a definition of
advocacy:
[T]o advocate for medically appropriate health care" means to discuss or rec-
ommend a course of treatment to an enrollee; to appeal a managed care plan's
decision to deny payment for a service pursuant to an established grievance or
appeal procedure; or to protest a decision, policy or practice that the provider
•.. reasonably believes impairs the provider's ability to provide medically ap-
propriate health care to the provider's patients.8 4
Some states seek to protect health care professionals' advocacy by
mandating advocacy protection provisions in all contracts between
HCPs and MCOs, while other states explicitly prohibit retaliation
against an HCP because of advocacy. Alaska takes the forrfier ap-
proach, requiring that:
[All] contract[s] between a participating health care provider and a managed
care entity ... must contain a provision that ... a health care provider may
not be penalized or the health care provider's contract terminated by the man-
aged care entity because the health care provider acts as an advocate for a
82. See, e.g., ALAsKA REV. STAT. § 21.07.010 (Patient and Health Care Provider Pro-
tection) (providing in (a)(5) that "[a] contract between a participating health care
provider and a managed care entity that offers a group managed care plan must
contain a provision that ... states that a health care provider may not be penal-
ized or the health care provider's contract terminated by the managed care entity
because the health care provider acts as an advocate for a covered person in seek-
ing appropriate, medically necessary health care services" (emphasis added)).
83. ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A § 4303(3).
84. Id. at § 4303(3)(A). For another example of a statutory definition of advocacy, see
ARiz. REV. STAT. § 20-827(B), which provides that hospital, medical, dental, and
optometric service corporations [which arrange for delivery of health care ser-
vices to subscribers] shall not:
2. Terminate a contract with or refuse to renew a contract with a health
care professional solely because the professional in good faith does any of
the following:
(a) Advocates in private or in public on behalf of a patient.
(b) Assists a patient in seeking reconsideration of a decision made by the
[health plan].., to deny coverage for a health care service.
(c) Reports a violation of law to an appropriate authority.
See also Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.609, which provides that:
5. No health carrier shall terminate a contract or employment solely or
in part because a health care provider in good faith:
(1) Advocates on behalf of an enrollee;
(2) Files a complaint against the health carrier;
(3) Appeals a decision of the health carrier;
(4) Provides information or files a report with the department of
insurance;
(5) Requests a hearing or review pursuant to this section.
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covered person in seeking appropriate, medically necessary health care
services."8 5
Arizona takes the alternative approach, expressly prohibiting re-
taliation against HCPs who engage in protected advocacy.8 6 The
choice between procedural and substantive contract protections is
classic in American jurisprudence. Depending on one's ideological
perspective, one either believes that parties to a deal can best achieve
the bargain they want and be protected against overreaching by know-
ing all the details of the transaction in advance, or by having substan-
tive limits placed on the terms of that transaction.8 7 In the case of
advocacy protection laws, the very limited number of lawsuits brought
by HCPs who have been deselected from an MCO makes it extremely
difficult to say that one method of protecting advocacy is superior to
any other.
Another difference among advocacy protection laws is that some
statutqs enumerate those activities which constitute prohibited retali-
ation against an HCP, while other statutes speak more generally of
not "penalizing" or "retaliating against" an HCP who engages in advo-
cacy on behalf of patients.8 8 The North Dakota statute is an example
of the former approach, providing a broad array of verboten actions:
An entity may not take any of the following actions against a health care pro-
vider solely because the provider, in good faith, reports to state or federal au-
thorities an act or practice by the entity that jeopardizes patient health or
welfare, or advocates on behalf of a patient in a utilization review program or
grievance procedure:
a. Refusal to contract with the health care provider;
b. Termination of or refusal to renew a contract with a health care provider;
c. Refusal to refer patients to or allow others to refer patients to the health
care provider; or
d. Refusal to compensate the health care provider for covered services that are
medically necessary.8 9
85. ALAsKA STAT. REV. § 21.07.010(a)(5). The Oregon statute takes a similar ap-
proach. OR. REV. STAT. § 743.803(2)(f) (1999). Whether or not such a mandatory
contract term would be preempted by ERISA, since it "relates to" the structure
and administration of an employee benefit plan or would be "saved" from ERISA
preemption by the insurance "savings clause" will be explored in Part V infra.
86. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. § 20-827(B).
87. A similar debate took place among courts and commentators about whether un-
conscionable consumer contracts are better conceptualized as a problem of sub-
stantive or procedural unconscionability. See, e.g., Arthur Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
485, 487 (1967).
88. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-478h(c) (2000) (providing that: "No managed
care organization shall take or threaten to take any action against any provider
in retaliation for such provider's assistance to an enrollee under the provisions of
subsection (e) of section 38a-226c [participation in expedited utilization review in
urgent health circumstances] or section 38a-478n [appeal to Insurance Commis-
sioner taken after enrollee has exhausted the MCO's internal grievance
procedure]").
89. N.D. CENT CODE § 26.1-04-03(18) (2002).
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Further, there are some advocacy protection laws that, while they
look good on paper, may have only a minimal impact on HCPs and the
patients they serve, due to the limited scope of the statute. For exam-
ple, the Kentucky law, which declares that the HCPs shall not be pe-
nalized or have their contract with a health plan terminated because
they have discussed treatment options and information with the pa-
tient or other persons, applies only to "Limited Health Service Benefit
Plans." These are plans such as vision plans or dental plans, which
encompass a narrow range of health care services.9 0 There are no
comparable provisions protecting HCP advocacy which apply to the
much larger number of traditional, full service MCOs that operate in
Kentucky.
Many of the statutes address incompletely a problem inherent in
protecting individuals from retaliation: how can we know whether the
MCO terminated or "non-renewed" its contract with the HCP because
of advocacy or for other reasons? What recourse should an MCO have
against an HCP who, in addition to being an advocate for patients, is
also a bad diagnostician or a careless surgeon, the possessor of an ab-
rasive personality, an "outlier" in the use of services, or simply one of a
number of specialists whom the MCO no longer needs to retain in its
network, either due to market changes or to a change in organization
or focus of the MCO? Seven statutes limit their protection to those
HCPs who are terminated "solely" because of their advocacy,9 1 but do
not articulate any mechanism for determining when advocacy is the
"sole" motivation for the HCP's deselection from the MCO.92 The ten
other statutes are silent on this point. Many statutes are also defi-
cient in failing to define or "operationalize" advocacy,9 3 because, as
the scenarios postulated in Section D above indicate, advocacy has dif-
ferent meanings to different people and under diverse circumstances.
Part V will address the consequences of the failure to clearly articu-
late and operationalize the concept of patient advocacy on the stat-
utes' ultimate effectiveness.
90. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17C-010(5) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
91. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 20-827(B); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 27-13-10-11 and 27-8-28-18; LA.
REV. STAT. § 22:215.18; Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.609; N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 4406-
d (5); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-04-03(18); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.803(2)(f).
92. Of course, courts are experts in allocating burdens of production and persuasion
in order to achieve a statute's goals, and it may not be necessary to explicitly lay
out all these steps in a statute. The response of at least one court to a statutory
lacuna will be explored in the Part V discussion of Lewis v. Individual Practice
Association of Western New York, Inc., 723 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 2001).
93. See ALAsKA REV. STAT. § 21.07.010(a)(5); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.803(2)(f).
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2. Implicit Protection of Advocacy
a. By Statutes
In addition to the explicit protection of advocacy, a number of
states have enacted statutes that can offer additional support for
health care professionals who advocate on behalf of their patients.
These statutes fall into four main groups: 1) statutes declaring that
HCPs cannot be terminated for rendering statutorily mandated health
care services, 2) so-called anti-gag clause provisions, that is, statutes
that declare that HCPs cannot be retaliated against for providing in-
formation to patients or other relevant individuals about available
treatment options, 3) laws mandating procedural protections for HCPs
in connection with termination or non-renewal of their contracts, and
4) statutes imposing limits on MCOs' ability to use financial incen-
tives or other cost-containment measures that could interfere with
HCPs' exercise of their professional judgment. Just as with statutes
providing explicit protection for HCPs' patient advocacy, the question
which must be answered in regard to supplemental support statutes is
how effective they are in protecting HCPs who act as advocates and
fiduciaries for their patients.
i. Prohibition of Retaliation Based on Rendering
Mandated Services
Several states have adopted statutes that prohibit the punishment
of HCPs who provide health care services that are mandated by an-
other statute, thus implicitly protecting the most basic type of advo-
cacy - the actual provision of patient services. In most instances,
these mandated services laws were enacted in response to a public
concern that health insurers and MCOs were imposing unduly narrow
utilization review or benefit eligibility criteria and denying medically
necessary and appropriate services. For example, many states and
Congress 9 4 adopted laws in the mid-1990s in response to a concern
that health plans were routinely mandating such short hospital stays
for a newborn child and its mother that they could be characterized as
"drive-through deliveries."95 These laws were enacted despite the
lack of clear evidence that requiring mothers and their newborns to
stay in the hospital at least 48 hours after a normal vaginal delivery
94. The Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996 is found at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1185 (1996).
95. Declerq & Simmes, The Politics of "Drive-through Deliveries": Putting Early Post-
partum Discharge on the Legislative Agenda, 75 MILBANK Q. 175 (1997); David A.
Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries: Is "Consumer Protection" Just What the Doctor
Ordered?, 78 N.C. L. REV. 5 (1999); see also CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, JAMEs E.
BLUMSTEIN, AND TROYEN A. BRENNAN, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 19-20 (2d
ed. 1998).
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was clinically necessary or good preventative health care.96 To give
these laws more teeth, a number of states adopted laws that specifi-
cally prohibited MCOs, health plans, and insurers from retaliating
against an HCP who provided the mandated services. For example,
Alabama enacted a law providing:
No health benefit plan subject to the provisions of this chapter [governing
mandatory maternity and newborn care] shall terminate the services, reduce
capitation payment, or otherwise penalize an attending ... [HCP] who orders
medical care consistent with this chapter. No health benefit plan shall pro-
vide, directly or indirectly, any financial incentive or disincentive ... to any
person to encourage or cause early discharge of a hospital patient from post-
partum care .... 97
Connecticut and Florida have adopted similar laws in regard to
out-patient mastectomies, which had become a cause c6l6bre at the
time.98 Indiana enacted a law proscribing punishment against health
care professionals who prescribed "nonformulary," typically more ex-
pensive, drugs to their patients.9 9 Rhode Island has enacted a law
that precludes "discrimination" against health care providers who
"treat[ I a' substantial number of patients who require expensive or
uncompensated medical care."10 0
96. Hyman, supra note 95.
97. ALA. CODE § 27-48-3 (1998); see also FLA. STAT. ch. 641.31(18)(f)(3), (4) (2003).
98. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-503d(b) provides:
No individual health insurance carrier may terminate the services of,
require additional documentation from, require additional utilization re-
view, reduce payments or otherwise penalize or provide financial disin-
centives to any attending health care provider on the basis that the
provider orders care consistent with the provisions of this section [man-
dating at least 48 hours of inpatient care following a mastectomy or
lymph node dissection, or longer if recommended by physician, and for-
bidding insurance policy from requiring outpatient surgery].
Chapter 641.31(31)(a) of the Florida statutes states that an HMO that provides
services for breast cancer treatment shall not limit inpatient services to a period
less than determined by treating provider to be medically necessary. The statute
further declares that an HMO may not:
(b)(3) Penalize or otherwise reduce or limit the reimbursement of an at-
tending provider solely because the attending provider provided care to a
covered patient under this subsection; [or]
(b)(4) Provide incentives, monetary or otherwise, to an attending pro-
vider solely to induce the provider to provide care to a covered patient in
a manner inconsistent with this subsection.
99. Section 27-13-38-1 parts (a) and (b) of the Indiana statutes mandate certain oper-
ations for HMOs' drug formularies and require that HMOs have procedures for
enrollees to obtain nonformulary drugs without incurring additional costs. Part
(c) declares that:
A health maintenance organization may not:
(1) void a contract; or
(2) refuse to renew a contract between the HMO and a prescribing pro-
vider because the prescribing provider has prescribed a medically neces-
sary and appropriate nonformulary drug or device as provided in
subsection (b)(2).
100. R. I. Gen. Laws § 23-17.13-3(c)(8) (2001).
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ii. Statutes Prohibiting "Gag Clauses"
The most common form of implicit HCP advocacy protection is
found in the so-called "anti-gag clause" statutes. A majority of states
enacted such laws in the mid-1990s, following widely circulating hor-
ror stories about physicians and other HCPs who were precluded from
disclosing MCO incentive arrangements to their patients, or discuss-
ing the full range of treatment options available, because of "gag
clause" provisions in the HCPs' contracts with MCOs.1o1 Although, as
noted above, the 1997 GAO Gag Clause Report failed to find any ex-
plicit bans on HCP-patient communication in the more than 500 man-
aged care contracts that were reviewed, the concern that managed
care was intruding into the sanctity of the HCP-patient relationship
struck a powerful chord with American citizens and their legislators.
The Delaware statute is typical:
An insurer shall not refuse to contract with or compensate for covered services
a participating or contracting healthcare provider solely because that provider
has in good faith communicated with 1 or more of the provider's current, for-
mer or prospective patients regarding the provisions, terms, or requirements
of the insurer's products or services as they relate to the needs of that pro-
vider's patients.'
0 2
Some statutes protect not only communications between the HCP
and the patient, but also between the HCP and others who may be
involved in delivering or paying for the patient's care.l0 3 Thus, the
101. See Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Extreme Risk - The New Cor-
porate Proposition for Physicians, 333 N.E. J. MED. 1706 (1995).
102. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 3339 (2001). Congress also enacted a law regarding gag
clauses that applies to Medicare managed care plans, although it was careful to
limit the effect of the law so as not to conflict with the disclosure requirements of
ERISA or state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(j) provides, inter alia, that:
a Medicare + Choice organization ... shall not prohibit or otherwise re-
strict a covered health professional.., from advising such an individual
who is a patient of the professional about the health status of the indi-
vidual or medical care or treatment for the individual's condition or dis-
ease, regardless of whether benefits for such care or treatment are
provided under the plan, if the professional is acting within the lawful
scope of practice.
103. LA. REV. STAT. § 22:215:18 provides that:
B. In a contract with a health care provider, a managed care organiza-
tion shall not include provisions that interfere with the ability of a
health care provider to communicate with a patient regarding his or her
health care, including but not limited to communications regarding
treatment options and medical alternatives, or other coverage
arrangement.
C. No managed care organization shall refuse to contract, renew, cancel,
restrict, or otherwise terminate a contract with a health care provider
solely on the basis of a medical communication. No managed care organ-
ization shall refuse to refer patients or to allow others to refer patients to
the health care provider, refuse to compensate the health care provider
for covered services, or take other retaliatory action against the health
care provider. As used in this Subsection "medical communication" shall
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Louisiana statute noted belowlO4 not only utilizes a broad definition of
"medical communication," but also explicitly prohibits a broad array of
retaliatory actions by MCOs, something not present in all anti-gag
clause statutes. Other statutes are more circumscribed in their scope,
in that they reject gag clause provisions in contracts between MCOs
and HCPs, but do not provide any sanction for a failure to comply with
the law.10 5
iii. Statutes Establishing Procedural Due Process for
Health Care Professionals
Another major way in which states have provided protection to
health care professionals who engage in advocacy for their patients is
by mandating government oversight and procedural due process pro-
tections for HCPs who are terminated or non-renewed by managed
care organizations. States require a wide variety of procedural due
process protections in order to ensure at least a basic level of fairness
in MCO-HCP relations. These include the requirements that MCOs
provide a minimum period of notice to HCPs whose contracts they are
terminating or not renewing, guaranteeing HCPs a hearing prior to
such termination or nonrenewal, mandating an additional appeals
process for HCPs who are dissatisfied with the hearing results, and
requiring that MCOs disclose their credentialing, profiling, and utili-
mean information regarding the mental or physical health care needs or
the treatment of a patient.
The Texas law is similar, although not quite as broad, declaring that:
(a) a health maintenance organization may not, as a condition of a con-
tract with a physician, dentist, or provider, or in any other manner, pro-
hibit, attempt to prohibit, or discourage a physician, dentist, or provider
from discussing with or communicating in good faith to a current, pro-
spective, or former patient, or a party designated by a patient, with re-
spect to:
(1) information or opinions regarding the patient's health care, including
the patient's medical condition or treatment options;
(b) a health maintenance organization may not in any way penalize, ter-
minate, or refuse to compensate for covered services, a physician, den-
tist, or provider for communicating with a current, prospective, or former
patient, or a party designated by a patient, in any manner protected by
this section.
TEX. INS. CODE art. 20A.18A (2002) (repealed 2003).
104. LA. REV. STAT. § 22:215:18.
105. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407.10(H) (2001) (providing that "[n]o contract be-
tween a carrier and a provider shall prohibit, impede or interfere in the discus-
sion of medical treatment options between a patient and a provider"). Likewise,
FLA. STAT. ch. 641.315(5) (Supp. 2003) declares that:
A contract [between an HMO and a provider] shall not contain any provi-
sion restricting the provider's ability to communicate information to the
provider's patient regarding medical care or treatment options for the
patient when the provider deems knowledge of such information by the
patient to be in the best interest of the health of the patient.
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zation review criteria to HCPs. Taken together, these procedural due
process statutes may provide enhanced protection to HCPs who be-
come "undesirable" members of an MCO network due to their advo-
cacy by giving HCPs remedies additional to those available at common
law to challenge their deselection from the MCO. At the same time,
however, these statutes may have unintended and not necessarily de-
sirable side effects. First, any HCP contract termination accompanied
by procedural due process becomes a reportable event to the Health-
care Integrity and Protection Data Bank.106 Second, a court may de-
cide that a legislature's enactment of certain procedural protections
forecloses the recognition of other, implicit public policies as well. 107
Many states require minimum notice of termination or nonrenewal
of a contract, a requirement which is binding upon both MCOs and
HCPs.1OS Frequently these statutes provide exceptions to the notice
requirement based on a threat to patient health or safety, pending dis-
ciplinary action, or provider fraud.10 9 One problem that can arise is to
determine what the relationship is between mandatory notice require-
ments and statutes that protect HCPs against retaliation due to advo-
cacy. In the only case to directly address this issue, Lewis v.
Individual Practice Association of Western New York, Inc., 11o an HMO
gave a participating provider 60 days notice that it was not renewing
his contract with the HMO. The applicable New York statute pro-
vided a number of procedural protections for HCPs, including a 60 day
minimum notice requirement as well as a provision that prohibited
106. See discussion in text accompanying notes 71-75 supra.
107. In Grossman v. Columbine Medical Group, Inc., 12 P.3d 269 (Colo. Ct. App.
1999), the Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the termination of a physician from
a medical group that provided services to a MCO. The physician argued that
both the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the public policy
interest in ensuring continuity of care for patients justified requiring the defend-
ants (a medical group and MCO) to provide him with a hearing prior to termina-
tion. The court disagreed, holding that since his contract permitted termination
without cause, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should not be
used "to circumvent terms for which ... [the physician] expressly bargained." Id.
at 271. The court also rejected the argument that there was a public policy inter-
est in maintaining the stability of the physician-patient relationship that re-
quired the defendants to provide the physician with a hearing. The court
declared that the legislature had already articulated the public policy on this
point when it enacted two statutes, not yet effective, which, taken together, per-
mitted MCOs to terminate health care providers without cause if they gave sixty
days notice, declaring, "It is not for the courts to enunciate the public policy of the
state if, as here, the General Assembly has spoken on the issue." Id. This case
illustrates the irony in the fact that the procedural protections intended to help
HCPs can end up hurting them, by limiting the remedies that a sympathetic judi-
ciary might otherwise have made available.
108. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-478(h) (1997) (mandating that both parties to
the contract give sixty days notice prior to termination).
109. Id.; see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.609(2)(1) (2001).
110. 723 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 2001).
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termination or nonrenewal of a contract due "solely" to the HCP's ad-
vocacy. The New York trial court ruled that while the HMO's compli-
ance with the minimum notice requirement of the statute meant that
the HCP was not entitled to a hearing or other procedural remedies
provided by the statute, nonetheless the HCP was entitled to litigate
the question of whether his nonrenewal was based on his patient ad-
vocacy. The court observed that any other interpretation of the stat-
ute would render the patient advocacy provisions of the statute
unenforceable, and pointed to an extensive legislative history showing
that the governor and legislature intended the statute to protect HCPs
who engaged in advocacy on behalf of their patients. 1 11
A second important procedural protection for providers is the re-
quirement that HCPs be given a hearing or other meaningful opportu-
nity to challenge the MCO's decision to terminate their contracts. The
New York statute is fairly typical, requiring that HCPs receive: 1)
written explanation of the reasons for the proposed termination,"l 2 2)
notice that they are entitled to request a hearing or review by a panel
appointed by the health care plan,113 3) a hearing before that panel, a
third of whose members must be clinicians in the same specialty as
the HCP under review,11 4 4) written notice of the panel's decision,115
and 5) time limits for action which are short enough to ensure that the
process does not drag out interminably but long enough to permit a
provider to prepare and present a case. 1 16 Exceptions to the statute
are provided for cases involving imminent harm to patient care, fraud,
or a final disciplinary action by a government agency that "impairs the
HCP's ability to practice."11 7 Other states provide lesser protections.
Delaware, for example, requires insurers to give written notice of the
reasons for termination or nonrenewal of a contract only if the HCP
requests such notice within twenty days, 11s and requires only "admin-
istrative review" of the challenged contract action, without specifying
the parameters of that review. 1 9 In contrast, Maine's statute is even
more protective than New York's, as the enumerated procedural pro-
tections apply to HCPs whose contracts are not renewed as well as
those whose contract is terminated, and the law also applies to HCPs
who are terminated "without cause." 120 The Maine statute also re-
quires that the MCO's notice of termination or nonrenewal include
111. Id. at 848-850.
112. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw §4406-d(2)(a) and (b)(9)(i).
113. Id. at § 4406-d(2)(b)(ii).
114. Id. at § 4406-d(2)(c).
115. Id. at § 4406-d(2)(d).
116. Id. at § 4406-d(2)(b)(iii), (iv) and (e).
117. Id. at § 4406-d(2)(a).
118. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3339(c) (2001).
119. Id.
120. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4303(3-B) (2002 Supp.).
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"[rieference to the evidence or documentation underlying the carrier's
decision . "... 121 Finally, the statute provides that "[a] carrier shall
permit a provider to review this evidence and documentation upon re-
quest,"122 thus making it much easier for an HCP to challenge his or
her termination or nonrenewal, and putting the MCO to its proof.
Yet another vehicle for protecting HCPs from contract termination
or nonrenewal are statutes that mandate that MCOs and insurers dis-
close their credentialing and/or utilization review criteria, so that
HCPs can know in advance the factors which will be used to evaluate
their performance in the MCO, and are also more able to challenge
their deselection for an alleged shortfall in their performance. Ken-
tucky adopted such a statute as part of its "Any Willing Provider"
law,123 which was reviewed by the Supreme Court.124 The Kentucky
law provides that "[i]nsurers shall establish relevant, objective stan-
dards for initial consideration of providers and for providers to con-
tinue as a participating provider.. ,,125 The statute further requires
the standards be adjusted to take into account the "case mix, severity
of illness, patient age" and other factors that could affect the HCP's
cost of providing care, and that "[a]ll data profiling or other data anal-
ysis pertaining to participating providers shall be done in a manner
which is valid and reasonable." 126 New York has taken a similar ap-
121. Id. at § 4303(3-A)(A)(2).
122. Id.
123. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-525 (2002). An "Any Willing Provider" (AWP) law
mandates that a health plan, MCO, or insurer permit any willing HCP who
meets the minimum credentialing requirements of that entity to treat its mem-
bers or enrollees. Physician groups have lobbied for such laws in a number of
states, claiming that they are necessary to ensure that physicians can continue to
practice their profession in a geographic area where managed care has heavily
penetrated. MCOs, on the other hand, generally oppose AWP laws, because they
make it much harder for the MCO to achieve efficiency and use the kinds of cost
containment measures which are essential to its success. Complying with an
AWP law means, for example, that an MCO will have to permit all one hundred of
the ophthalmologists in a particular area to be participating providers, rather
than choosing twenty whom it believes are both clinically qualified and under-
stand the basic premises of managed care. Supervising these one hundred physi-
cians will require the MCO to engage in more contracting, more paperwork, and
other kinds of oversight, while the MCO simultaneously can exercise less control
over each physician, as physicians can belong to many MCOs and will be less
likely to be beholden to any one health plan. AWP laws also deny insureds the
ability to seek health care coverage "from a closed network of health-care provid-
ers in exchange for a lower premium." Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller,
123 Sup. Ct. 1471, 1478 (2003).
124. In Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 Sup. Ct. 1471 (2003), the
Supreme Court upheld Kentucky's AWP law against a claim of ERISA preemp-
tion, finding that although it "relate[d] to" employee benefit plans, it was "saved"
from preemption as a "law ... which regulates insurance." Id. at 1479.
125. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-525(1).
126. Id.
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proach, requiring MCOs to 1) develop "methodologies to collect and
analyze health care professional profiling data" in consultation with
HCPs, 2) use the data to evaluate HCPs against objective, agreed
upon criteria and to compare HCPs who treat comparable patient
populations, 3) have policies and procedures to ensure that HCPs are
informed of information which is used to evaluate their performance,
4) disclose these data periodically to HCPs, and 5) provide them with
an opportunity to respond to the MCO's assessment of their perform-
ance, including clarifying the nature of their patient population, and
working cooperatively with the MCO to improve their performance. 127
These laws can provide essential ammunition for litigation by HCPs
who assert that they were deselected by an MCO due to their patient
advocacy, because they provide relatively objective criteria, chosen in
advance by the MCO, by which the HCP's satisfaction of their contract
requirements can be measured.
At least two states appear to sharply limit the utility of their
credentialing and profiling statutes, by declaring that the statute or
the information provided under it cannot be used to provide a private
right of action. The Delaware statute, which we have already noted
offers somewhat rudimentary procedural protections for HCPs in
other respects, nonetheless requires that insurers who collect and use
"professional profiling data" in evaluating an HCP's performance
must disclose the data to the HCP and discuss it during the adminis-
trative review process.128 However, the statute also provides a signifi-
cant caveat: "This section shall not be deemed to create a private
cause of action as a result of an insurer's termination or nonrenewal of
a provider's contract. This section shall not abrogate any cause of ac-
tion or remedy to which a provider may have a right pursuant to con-
tract."' 29 Thus, one is left wondering what the effect of the statutory
mandate to disclose professional profiling data really is. It seems
likely that the result of this proviso will be to ensure that all contracts
governing MCO-HCP relations in Delaware will include language ex-
pressly denying an HCP any other ground on which to sue for termi-
nation or nonrenewal. Similarly, in Maryland, the applicable statute
appears to protect HCPs by mandating that "practice profile" 130 data
be provided to all HCPs who contract with HMOs. The profiling crite-
ria must be disclosed at the commencement of their contractual rela-
127. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 4406-d(4) (2002).
128. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3339(e) (2001).
129. Id. at § 3339(h).
130. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 19-710(s)(1) (2002 Replacement) provides that
'practice profile' means a profile, summary, economic analysis, or other
analysis of data concerning services rendered or utilized by a provider
under contract with or employed by a health maintenance organization
for the provision of health care services by the provider to enrollees or
subscribers of the health maintenance organization.
2003]
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tionship and annually thereafter if the HCP requests it, along with
information concerning the "manner in which the practice profile is
used to evaluate" the HCP.131 Unfortunately, the benefits of receiving
these data are significantly undercut by the statute's pronouncement
that "[the information provided under this subsection may not be
used to create a cause of action."13 2 Although it is possible that the
Maryland Department of Insurance will vigorously enforce the law
governing practice profiling by HMOs, it would appear far more useful
to give HCPs a direct means of challenging the termination or nonre-
newal of their contract with an HMO. As all law students learn early
in their career, "There is no right without a remedy." 133
iv. Statutes Prohibiting Financial Incentives to Control
Costs
Finally, a small number of states have provided general support
for HCPs who advocate on their patients' behalf by enacting laws that
seek to limit MCOs' use of cost-containment measures which could
compromise clinical care. The New Hampshire statute is typical:
No contract between a health carrier and a participating provider shall con-
tain any payment or reimbursement provision the terms of which creates [sic]
an inducement for the provider to not provide medically necessary care to cov-
ered persons. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the use of
payment arrangements between a health carrier and a participating provider
or provider group, which involve capitation, withholds or other
arrangements. 1 3
4
Maine has adopted a similar statute, which spells out in some detail
the precise form that cost-control measures are permitted to take. 135
Under this statute, managed care plans may offer general induce-
ments to limit care such as capitation or risk-sharing that apply to
groups of enrollees and groups of providers, but "may not offer or pay
any type of material inducement, bonus, or other financial incentive to
a participating provider to deny, reduce, withhold, limit or delay spe-
cific medically necessary health care services covered under the plan
to an enrollee."13 6
Two states, New Mexico and North Carolina, have adopted stat-
utes that combine a condemnation of MCO financial incentives that
would induce HCPs "to provide less than medically necessary services
131. Id. at (s)(2).
132. Id. at (s)(3).
133. See, e.g., Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 953 (1703) (Holt, C.J.) ("It is a vain
thing to imagine a right without a remedy; for want of right and want of remedy
are reciprocal"); see also The Western Maid v. Thompson, 257 U.S. 419, 433
(1922) (Holmes, J.) ("Legal obligations that exist but cannot be enforced are
ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive to the grasp.").
134. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-J: 8 (VIII) (2000).
135. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4303 (3-B) (2003).
136. Id.
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to an enrollee" 137 with a concern that HCPs should not be required to
violate their fiduciary duties to their patients, including the duty of
full disclosure of all available treatments, thus bringing us back to the
most common form of implicit advocacy protection law, the "anti-gag
clause" statute. The North Carolina law prohibits financial incentives
in much the same way as New Hampshire and Maine,138 and also de-
clares that while providers must "comply with the quality assurance
programs of the HMO... [tihe quality assurance programs shall not
override the professional or ethical responsibility of the provider or
interfere with the provider's ability to provide information or assis-
tance to the patient." 139 Similarly, New Mexico law provides suc-
cinctly that:
No managed health care plan may:
(1) adopt a gag rule or practice that prohibits a health care provider from dis-
cussing a treatment option with an enrollee ... ;
(2) include in any of its contracts with health care providers any provisions
that offer an inducement, financial or otherwise, to provide less than medi-
cally necessary services to an enrollee; or
(3) require a health care provider to violate any recognized fiduciary duty of
his profession or place his license in jeopardy. 140
While these laws may be rather grandly written, particularly in re-
gard to their injunction against MCO inducement of HCPs to violate
their professional ethics, they provide a statement of public policy that
could prove useful to an HCP who asserts wrongful termination from
an MCO because of patient advocacy.
b. Other Statutory Protections for Advocacy
Finally, creative attorneys have used other statutes to challenge
MCOs who have penalized those HCPs advocating on behalf of pa-
tients. Lawyers for aggrieved HCPs have invoked the Sherman Anti-
trust Act, 14 1 RICO,142 and a variety of state statutes such as deceptive
business practices laws, in an attempt to gain relief for their clients.
However, these efforts have met with mixed success. Courts have de-
nied the claims of HCPs that MCOs conspired with hospitals to pres-
sure HCPs to comply with managed care policies, both written and
unwritten, threatening a hospital with the loss of its contract with an
MCO unless the hospital persuades the HCP to go along with the
137. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-57-6(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-265 (2001).
139. Id. at § 58-67-88(H)(2). This law is designed to ensure continuity of care for pa-
tients with certain acute, chronic, or terminal illnesses, even though the HMO or
the provider may have terminated its contractual relationship or the patient's
health coverage has changed.
140. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-57-6.
141. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1997).
142. RICO is the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (2003).
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MCO policy, implicitly rejecting the HCPs' arguments that the MCOs
are either capable of using, or have used, significant market power to
get their way. 143 Courts have dismissed RICO claims because the
HCP failed to allege the requisite predicate criminal act.144 But the
Connecticut Supreme Court permitted a suit for wrongful termination
of physicians' contracts to go forward based, inter alia, on claims that
the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act and the Connecticut Un-
fair Insurance Practices Act were violated when the defendant insur-
ance company made misleading statements about the physicians'
qualifications and status under the insurer's health plan.14 5
B. Common Law Protection for Advocacy
Apart from statutes which provide explicit and implicit support for
HCPs' patient advocacy, there is also common law that supports HCPs
who advocate for patients, although there is significant variation
among the states. These cases include decisions that physicians have
a fiduciary duty to advocate for their patients, discussed in Part III.
above, 146 opinions considering whether contracts between HCPs and
MCOs should be interpreted to include an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and cases involving the tort of the right to fair
procedure, the right to be free from tortious interference with a con-
tract, and other common law torts.
1. Fiduciary Duty to Advocate
The case law is mixed as to whether HCPs have a common law
fiduciary duty to advocate on behalf of their patients. The majority of
cases that have found that there is a duty to advocate emphasizes the
fiduciary role that physicians and other HCPs have with their pa-
tients, the importance of the trust that patients place in their HCPs,
and the reality that if the patient's treating health professional does
143. See Finkelstein v. Aetna Health Plans, Inc., 1997 WL 419211, *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(relying on Kartell v. Blue Shield, 749 F.2d 922, 926 (1st Cir. 1984) for the pro-
position that "in the complex context of health insurance contracts, no antitrust
liability lies where an insurer 'pays the bill and seeks to set the amount [and the
terms] for the charge'"). For example, see Wagner v. Magellan Health Services,
Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 673 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (dismissing the plaintiffs antitrust ac-
tion, which grew out of the facts discussed in Wagner v. Magellan Health Ser-
vices, Inc., Cause No. 01 L225 (Cir. Ct for 19th Judic. Cir., Lake County, Ill.)
(currently pending)), discussed infra in section IV.B., because under the Cop-
perweld doctrine a corporation cannot conspire with its own employees.
144. See, e.g., Wagner v. Magellan Health Servs., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 302 (N.D. Ill.
2000) (dismissing the plaintiffs RICO action, based on the facts discussed in
Wagner v. Magellan Health Servs., Inc, Cause No. 01-L225 (Cir. Ct for 19th
Judic. Cir., Lake County, Ill.) (currently pending), discussed infra in section IV.B.
145. Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 680 A.2d 127 (Conn. 1996) discussed infra
in text accompanying notes 256-259.
146. See discussion in section III.C. supra.
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not advocate, it is unlikely that anyone else will, or that the patient
will even know that there is something to advocate about.147 In the
one case that declined to find a duty to advocate by physicians,
Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,148 the court relied on the amicus
brief of a state medical society urging it not to impose such a duty.149
In contrast, the AMA has recognized that because of the conflicts in-
herent in managed health care, in which physicians are given finan-
cial incentives to under-treat their patients, physicians must act as
advocates for their patients, both by participating at the macro level
in research and policymaking about what types of diagnostic and
treatment procedures should be performed under specified clinical cir-
cumstances, and by arguing for the treatment of particular patients
when their individual medical condition merits it, regardless of
whether the patients meet standardized clinical parameters. 150 Thus,
courts that impose a duty to advocate for patients on health care pro-
fessionals are simply restating a public policy position of long-stand-
ing, that the association between health care professionals and their
patients creates a fiduciary relationship, which requires protective ju-
dicial action.
147. These cases have recognized a duty to advocate in a variety of circumstances,
finding that physicians have a duty to inform a third party payor of the facts
which justify extended treatment or hospitalization, Wickline v. California, 239
Cal. Rptr. 810 (App. 1986); to fill out forms necessary to obtain health insurance
coverage, Murphy v. Godwin, 303 A.2d 668, 674 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973); and to
make it clear to the payor that urgent medical treatment is necessary, Nealy v.
U.S. Healthcare, 711 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 1999); see also Pa. Psychiatric Soc'y v.
Magellan Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting a series of cases
that recognized that physicians are able to effectively advocate on behalf of their
patients, in the context of ruling that psychiatrists may have standing to assert
the interests of their mentally ill patients who had been denied treatment by the
defendant MCO); Shea v. Esenstein, 208 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that a
physician has a duty to disclose potential conflicts of interest that might lead him
not to recommend a referral to a specialist).
148. 245 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2001).
149. See discussion supra in text accompanying note 44. The basis for the medical
society's position was not stated in Pryzbowski, but it appears that many physi-
cians are uncomfortable with having a court impose such a fiduciary duty be-
cause they lack power to effectively challenge a MCO. Alternatively, physicians
may believe it is wrong to hold them responsible when it is really the third party
payor that is making medical treatment decisions in the guise of utilization re-
view and payment decisions. See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d
1321 (5th Cir. 1992). Indeed, one court has so held, finding that a medical direc-
tor for an HMO was practicing medicine (and was therefore subject to state disci-
plinary review) when he denied approval for proposed surgery. Murphy v. Board
of Medical Examiners, 949 P.2d 530 (Ariz. App. 1997).
150. See discussion at text accompanying notes 21 - 27 supra.
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2. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The nature of the physician-patient relationship is at the heart of
decisions which have interpreted the nature of the contract between
MCOs and HCPs. In the landmark case of Harper v. Healthsource
New Hampshire, Inc.,151 the New Hampshire Supreme Court con-
strued the contract between an HMO, Healthsource New Hampshire,
and a participating physician, Dr. Harper, to include an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. The implied covenant meant that
the physician was entitled to a hearing at which he could challenge his
termination from the HMO and the purported reasons for that termi-
nation. During Harper's ten year affiliation with Healthsource, its pa-
tients had come to account for thirty to forty percent of his patient
population. Harper complained to the HMO that it was "manipulat-
ing" his patients' records, apparently to change the reimbursement
due him under a contractual withhold provision. Immediately after
this charge, the HMO announced that it was terminating Harper "for
cause," allegedly because he had not met the HMO's "recredentialing"
criteria, even though the HMO had no concerns about his quality of
care. 152 When Harper sought to challenge his termination through
the HMO's internals appeals process, he was repeatedly denied access
to the documentation that the HMO said it had relied on in making its
decision. Ultimately, the HMO terminated Harper "without cause."
Harper argued that this termination, made without a meaningful
hearing, violated public policy. The court agreed, finding that al-
though Harper's contract with the HMO permitted him to be termi-
nated with or without cause, the public policy interests in the
physician-patient relationship and access to health care in the man-
aged care setting required that the contract be interpreted in light of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing imposed upon each
party to a contract.153 The court stressed that "[glood faith perform-
ance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expecta-
tions of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct char-
acterized as involving 'bad faith' because they violate community
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness." 15 4 The court went
on to hold that:
A terminated physician is entitled to review of the termination decision under
... [the standard of good faith and fair dealing], whether the termination was
for cause, or without cause. This rule does not eliminate a health mainte-
nance organization's contractual right to terminate its relationship with a
physician without cause .... If a physician's relationship, however, is termi-
151. 674 A.2d 962 (N.H. 1996).
152. Id. at 963.
153. Id. at 965 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979)).
154. Id. (citing cmt. a to § 205).
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nated without cause and the physician believes that the decision to terminate
was, in truth, made in bad faith or based upon some factor that would render
the decision contrary to public policy, then the physician is entitled to review
of the decision.155
The Harper court thus spoke very broadly, relying on the public
policy interest in protecting the physician-patient relationship and the
legislative wish that "preferred provider agreements must be 'fair and
in the public interest"' 15 6 to effectively grant a physician who is termi-
nated from an HMO the right to a hearing whenever the physician
disagrees with the decision of the HMO, or whenever there is a colora-
ble case that there was a hidden, impermissible reason for the
termination.157
In contrast to Harper, in Sammarco v. Anthem Insurance Cos. 158
and Grossman v. Columbine Medical Group, Inc.159 two mid-level
state courts rejected physicians' efforts to challenge their termination
from a health plan based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. These courts declined to consider the MCO's obligations to
the contracting physician in light of the changed physician-patient re-
lationship wrought by managed care, or to recognize a public policy
need to ensure continuity of care for patients. Instead, the courts fo-
cused on the "strictly business" relationship between physicians and
MCOs, concluding that because they had equal bargaining power in
the contract negotiation process, it would therefore be inappropriate
to construe the contracts between them to include an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.
In Sammarco, an insurance company terminated the contracts of
some physicians after a merger of several insurance companies left
the merged entity with a provider surplus. The physicians sued for
wrongful termination, claiming that they had been misled about the
nature of the merger, had not been told that the merger would convert
a not-for-profit company to a for-profit, and had been unfairly treated
by this surprise termination. 160 The physicians asserted that several
important public policy interests (the need to protect the public inter-
est in adequate access to health care recognized in several Ohio consti-
tutional and statutory provisions, the fiduciary duty physicians owe to
their patients, and the physicians' interest in practicing their profes-
sion "in any manner [they see] fit") required that the contract between
the insurance company and the physicians be construed to require
155. Id. at 966 (citation omitted).
156. Id. (citing N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 420-C:1).
157. On remand, Harper and Healthsource conducted a seven week trial, which was
settled by the parties during jury deliberations. Personal communication with
Stanton Tefft, counsel for Harper.
158. 723 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
159. 12 P.3d 269 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
160. 723 N.E.2d 128, 131, 137-39.
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both parties to act in accordance with a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.161 The court rejected this argument, noting that the contract
permitted termination of physicians "without cause," that physicians
and insurance companies stood on an equal economic footing (in con-
trast to relationship between insureds and insurance companies), and
that insurance companies were allowed to make decisions (such as
cutting the size of provider panels) based on economic considerations
and the profit motive. 162
Similarly, in Grossman, the Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the
termination of a physician from a medical group that provided ser-
vices to an MCO.163 The court declined to infer a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing into a contract for which the physician had "ex-
pressly bargained."16 4 The court also rejected a plea to use non-statu-
tory "public policy" justifications to reach a different result, where the
legislature had already provided certain procedural protections to
physicians, and thus had already "spoken on the issue."'165
3. Common Law Right to Fair Procedure
In Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 1 6 6 the California Su-
preme Court used the common law tort of fair procedure to hold that
Dr. Potvin, a physician who was "delisted" from a health insurer's pre-
ferred provider list, was entitled to a hearing in which he could chal-
lenge the grounds for termination, notwithstanding a contract which
permitted termination "without cause." 16 7 The court noted that the
tort of fair procedure had been used for more than one hundred years
to protect individuals against the arbitrary exercise of private power,
where a private entity's action had major economic consequences for
the affected individual.168 Dr. Potvin, an obstetrician-gynecologist,
claimed that the MetLife patients constituted a significant fraction of
161. Id. at 133-36.
162. Id. at 133-35. The court also turned down the physicians' claim that the insur-
ance companies had tortiously interfered with the physicians' relationship with
their patients, finding first that it was the patients who had terminated the con-
tract with their doctors (after finding out that the doctors had been terminated
from their health plan) and also that the insurance companies had not precluded
the patients from seeing their doctors, but had only declined to pay for the visits.
Id. at 136.
163. 12 P.3d 269.
164. Id. at 271.
165. Id.
166. 997 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 2000).
167. Id. at 1162. Dr. Potvin was terminated allegedly because he did not meet the
current malpractice selection and retention standards, even though there had
been were no new malpractice cases brought against him since he had first en-
tered into a contract with Metropolitan Life. Id. at 1155-56. The case was settled
after remand. Personal interview with Henry Fenton, attorney for Dr. Potvin.
168. Id. at 1157.
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his practice, and also asserted that MetLife's action had a significant
economic domino effect, since he was obligated to reveal his termina-
tion by MetLife to other insurers and MCOs, leading to his removal
from their preferred provider lists and a decrease in referrals from
other physicians. 16 9
The California Supreme Court also emphasized the important pub-
lic interest in protecting access to health care in a managed care era in
determining that Potvin must receive a hearing. The court cited
Harper v. Healthsource New Hampshire, Inc. and noted the "great [ I
public interest . . .at stake when . . .medical services are provided
through the unique tripartite relationship among an insurance com-
pany, its insureds, and the physicians who participate in the preferred
provider network."17o Thus, the court declined to enforce the contract
provision that permitted termination "without cause," because to do so
would effectively eviscerate the common law right to fair procedure. 17 1
4. Additional Common Law Theories
Other common law theories may also be advanced by creative
plaintiffs' counsel. As these causes of action have not yet been suc-
cessfully invoked, I will sketch them only briefly. One is for breach of
contract in violation of a public policy interest grounded in profes-
sional ethics and the second is for tortious interference with contract
or a business relationship. The former category of claims has been
recognized increasingly, although not universally, during the last
three decades.' 7 2
In Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,17 3 for example, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that that a professional code of ethics
could form the basis for a non-statutory public policy exception to the
doctrine of employment at-will. Dr. Grace Pierce claimed that she
was, in effect, fired from her research position at Ortho Pharmaceuti-
cal after she decided she could not ethically continue to pursue re-
169. Id. at 1156.
170. The court noted:
Our conclusion that the relationship between insurers and their pre-
ferred provider physicians significantly affects the public interest does
not necessarily mean that every insurer wishing to remove a doctor from
one of its preferred provider lists must comply with the common law
right to fair procedure. The obligation to do so arises only when the in-
surer possesses power so substantial that the removal significantly im-
pairs the ability of an ordinary, competent physician to practice
medicine or a medical specialty in a particular geographic area, thereby
affecting an important, substantial economic interest.
Id. at 1160.
171. Id. at 1162.
172. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980), and cases cited
therein.
173. 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980).
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search to develop loperamide, a drug for infants and children, because
it contained a high dosage of saccharin, which had caused cancer in
some laboratory animals and whose safety was the subject of ongoing
scientific controversy. While the court accepted that, in general, the
Hippocratic Oath and AMA Code of Medical Ethics could support a
public policy exception to the doctrine of employment at-will, it also
found that the facts did not support a conclusion that Dr. Pierce's pro-
fessional, as opposed to personal, ethics were the basis for her refusal
to work on the project.17 4
Pierce has been cited with approval by numerous other courts, in-
cluding the Colorado Supreme Court in its decision in Rocky Mountain
Hospital & Medical Service v. Mariani.1 75 The court there found that
"[a] professional employee forced to choose between violating his or
her ethical obligations or being terminated is placed in an intolerable
position." 17 6 The test for whether a nonstatutory code of ethics can be
used as the source of public policy is whether the "ethical provision...
[is] designed to serve the interests of the public rather than the inter-
ests of the profession."17 7 In an important pre-Enron decision, the
court held that the Colorado State Board of Accountancy Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct constituted an appropriate expression of public pol-
icy because they had an "important public purpose[:] [to] ensure the
accurate reporting of financial information to the public ... [and] to
allow the public and the business community to rely with confidence
on financial reporting."178 The court therefore permitted Diana Mari-
ani, a CPA employed by Blue Cross and Blue Shield, to proceed to trial
on her claim of retaliatory discharge for refusing to falsify accounting
information prepared in support of a proposed merger among several
Blue Cross and Blue Shield organizations. 179
Building on decisions such as Pierce and Mariani, it appears that
health care professionals who have been terminated due to their advo-
cacy on behalf of their patients can also make a compelling case that
the termination or nonrenewal of their contract with an insurer or
MCO is a violation of public policy, because their professional codes of
ethics demand that they engage in such advocacy. 180 Further, in
174. Id. at 514.
175. 916 P.2d 519 (Colo. 1996).
176. Id. at 525.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 526.
179. Id. at 521-22, 527.
180. See the AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION and AMERICAN NURSING ASSOCIATION
CODES OF ETHICS, discussed in section II.B, supra notes 21-22. Physicians,
nurses, and other health care professionals should argue that the code of ethics
provisions requiring advocacy on behalf of patients are designed to benefit the
public, not the health professionals themselves, and should demonstrate how
their advocacy actions are mandated by the code, and do not simply reflect a per-
sonal, idiosyncratic view of health care ethics.
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states which do not provide explicit statutory protection for patient
advocacy, an HCP who alleges wrongful termination due to patient
advocacy can argue that a termination "without cause" or minimal no-
tice provision should not be enforced. To this end, as the Supreme
Courts of California and New Hampshire declared in Potvin and
Harper, respectively, that a termination without cause provision was
unenforceable as against public policy, in light of the need to protect
patient-physician relationships and to ensure adequate access to qual-
ity health care in the managed care context. Under these circum-
stances, a court should find that a terminated HCP must be given a
hearing. Even in a state like Ohio, where the Sammarco court de-
clined to read an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into
what it saw as an "arms length" business contract between a physi-
cian and an insurance company,lSl a court should still be willing to
enforce a clear mandate of public policy, based on national codes of
professional ethics that should be recognized in virtually every state
and declare that health professionals should not be "forced to choose
between violating his or her ethical obligations or being
terminated .. ."182
A second promising common law remedy is the cause of action for
tortious interference with a contract. This tort holds a defendant lia-
ble for damages caused by intentional actions in inducing the breach
of, or otherwise interfering with, a contractual relationship between
the plaintiff and a third party.183 The traditional rule is that once a
plaintiff makes a preliminary showing that his contract with a third
party was interfered with by the defendant, the burden shifts to the
defendant to show that this interference was justified, 184 although
some more recent cases, following the position of the Second Restate-
ment of Torts, have held that the plaintiff must initially establish the
wrongfulness of the interference.1s 5 To succeed a plaintiff need not
prove that the contract was breached in its entirety, but may simply
show that the contract has become more onerous to perform or ren-
dered less valuable.1S6
In the patient advocacy context, this means that if an HCP can
show that due to advocacy on behalf of patients the MCO interfered.
with his contract with a third party, he can successfully bring an ac-
181. Samarco, 723 N.E.2d at 133-36.
182. Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 525 (Colo. 1996).
183. See generally PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 129 (5th ed. 1984);
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw OF TORTS §§ 445-446 (2000).
184. PROSSER, supra note 183, at § 129.
185. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1042-43 (Ariz.
1985) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766); Mason v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 969 S.W.2d 160, 162-66 (Ark. 1998); DOBBS, supra note 183, at 1260.
186. Herman v. Endriss, 446 A.2d 9, 10 (Conn. 1982); DOBBS, supra note 183, at 1267-
68.
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tion for tortious interference with a contract. For example, in Wagner
v. Magellan Health Services, Inc.,18 7 Dr. Wagner, a psychiatrist, al-
leged that Magellan, a "behavioral health" MCO, penalized him for
advocating for necessary inpatient treatment of seriously ill and un-
stable individuals by refusing to permit him to be the attending physi-
cian for any Magellan patient. Wagner alleged a series of events in
which he and Magellan disagreed about the necessity of hospitalizing
particular patients and described his virtual blacklisting by the MCO.
He further alleged that Magellan exerted pressure on Good Shepherd
Hospital, where Wagner had staff privileges, by threatening to termi-
nate the hospital's contract with Magellan as a participating provider.
Wagner alleged that these actions constituted intentional interference
with his staff privileges contract with Good Shepherd Hospital. While
this case is still awaiting trial, the use of this cause of action for tor-
tious interference with contract may prove to be a good strategic
choice.
V. BARRIERS TO ENFORCEMENT OF ADVOCACY
PROTECTION LAWS
We now turn to the key question of enforceability; that is, whether
or not state statutes that seek to protect health care professionals
from retaliation for patient advocacy can be successfully invoked by
HCPs. There are three major groups of enforcement issues, which
range from the complex and highly sophisticated to the practical and
mundane aspects of pursuing litigation. The first group raises com-
plex questions of federalism as well as difficult substantive law issues,
specifically whether two federal laws - ERISA and the Social Security
Act, which governs Medicarel 8S- preempt state advocacy protection
statutes and thus preclude state legislative efforts to affect the quality
and structure of health care delivery. The second involves procedural
matters, including questions about allocating the burdens of proof for
retaliation by an MCO, as well as determining the proper scope of dis-
covery. The third involves the practical costs of litigation, which may
deter or prevent many deselected HCPs from attaining legal redress.
A. Federalism
1. ERISA Preemption
In the ongoing saga of federalism and the quest to identify appro-
priate and complementary roles for state and federal government, few
areas have gained more attention recently than the continuing ten-
187. Cause No. 01-L225 (Cir. Ct for 19th Judic. Cir., Lake County, Ill.) (currently
pending).
188. Medicare is governed by Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, which is codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1395-1395ggg (2000).
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sions between providing a uniform, national set of rules for health
care delivery and preserving the states' role in expanding access to,
and improving the quality of, the health care that their citizens re-
ceive. For many years, ERISA has been viewed as a significant im-
pediment to state efforts at health care reform because of its powerful
preemptive effect.1 8 9 ERISA was enacted to protect employees' inter-
est in their "employee benefit plans" (EBPs), including pension plans
and "welfare plans" (which provide health care and disability cover-
age) from the actions of unscrupulous employers or union leaders,
which had led to many workers' loss of their retirement benefits after
years of work.190 Congress' goal was also to provide a uniform federal
law of fiduciary obligation for EBPs, to make it easier for corporations
operating in multiple states to do business, without having to comply
with the competing laws of different states. However, an unintended
consequence of ERISA has been to make it difficult for states to enact
laws regulating health care delivery, because of the preemptive effect
of ERISA § 514(a), the so-called "relate to" clause. 19 1 This provision
states that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... "192
In effect, this means that ERISA acts like a giant eraser, sweeping
across the United States and rubbing out any state statute or common
law remedy that "relate[s] to" an employee benefit plan, which in-
cludes most Americans' health care, disability, and pension plans. 193
Further, since ERISA provides only procedural safeguards for the re-
porting, disclosure, and fiduciary obligations which govern employee
benefit plans, without regulating their substantive content,194 in
many cases the "relate to" clause's practical effect has been to deprive
litigants of recourse to state law remedies without providing any alter-
native federal remedy in their place. 19 5
189. FURROW ET AL., supra note 36; see also Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About
the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism,
33 HARv. J. LEGISL. 35, 38 (1996); Mary Ann Chirba-Martin and Troyen Brennan,
The Critical Role of ERISA in State Health Reform, I HEALTH AFFAIRS 144 (1994).
190. FuRRow ET AL., supra note 36, at 419.
191. ERISA § 514(a) is codified at 29 U.S.C. §1144(a) (2000).
192. Id. (emphasis added).
193. Most Americans receive their health care and disability coverage through a fam-
ily member's employment, although this percentage is declining as such coverage
becomes increasingly burdensome, with premiums rising and employers paying a
smaller share of those premiums. FURROW ET AL., supra note 36, at 466-68.
194. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724 (1985). For example, the Department
of Labor, which administers ERISA, has only recently promulgated regulations
governing the process by which beneficiaries of EBPs may appeal the denial of
health care coverage under group health plans, filling a gap which had previously
left many persons aggrieved by a denial of care remediless. In addition, see 65
Fed. Reg. 70,246, providing an overview of the regulations found at 29 C.F.R. pt.
2560.503-1, which became effective on January 1, 2002.
195. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
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The meaning of the "relate to" clause has evolved over time. Ini-
tially, the Supreme Court read the clause quite expansively, finding
that Congress intended to preempt state laws that had any "connec-
tion with or reference to" an employee benefit plan. 196 In the 1987
case of Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 197 the Court declared that
the plaintiffs common law tort suit for bad faith breach of contract
against a disability insurer was preempted by ERISA, since the insur-
ance company's conduct in processing the plaintiffs claim for disabil-
ity benefits "relate[d] to" the employee benefit plan at issue. 198
However, in 1995, in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,199 the Supreme Court took a
new, narrower view of ERISA preemption. The Court considered a
challenge to a New York law designed to equalize the costs of different
types of health care coverage by imposing differential surcharges for
hospital care on commercial insurance companies, Blue Cross and
Blue Shield plans, and HMOs. The Supreme Court acknowledged
that, read literally, the "relate to" clause had no limits, because "if
'relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indetermi-
nacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its
course, for 'really, universally, relations stop nowhere."'200 Rejecting
such a broad interpretation, the Court began with the presumption
that Congress did not intend to preempt state law without making a
clear and manifest statement of intent,20 cautioning that "nothing in
the language of [ERISA] or in the context of its passage indicate[d]
that Congress chose to displace general health care regulation, which
historically has been a matter of local concern." 20 2 The Court then
held that the New York surcharge law, which had only an indirect
effect on the costs of providing an employee benefit plan, did not "re-
late to" the employee benefit plan, because it "[did] not bind plan ad-
ministrators to any particular choice and thus function as a regulation
of an ERISA plan itself."203 The Court contrasted the surcharge law
with laws that "mandated employee benefit structures or their admin-
istration," which were clearly preempted by ERISA.204 The Travelers
196. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
197. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
198. Id. at 48. The Court also ruled that the cause of action was not saved from pre-
emption by the insurance "savings clause," because the common law tort was not
"specifically directed toward [the insurance] industry," but had a much broader
scope and provided remedies additional to those permitted under ERISA. Id. at
50-52.
199. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
200. Id. at 655 (citations omitted).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 661.
203. Id. at 659.
204. Id. at 658.
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decision began a trend of judicial cutbacks on ERISA preemption that
continues to the present. 20 5
It is also important to recognize that state laws that "relate to" an
employee benefit plan are "saved" from ERISA preemption if they
"regulate insurance,"206 reflecting the balance that Congress struck in
ERISA between providing uniform national rules to govern employee
benefit plans and the need to accommodate the traditional interests of
the states in regulating the terms and conditions of insurance policies.
The effect of this Congressional compromise was seen in operation in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,20 7 in which the Su-
preme Court held that a Massachusetts statute mandating that all
insurance policies sold within the state provide minimum mental
health benefits was saved from ERISA preemption by the insurance
"savings clause." Consequently, the Massachusetts statute applied to
all insurance policies purchased for employee benefit plans by Massa-
chusetts employers. 208
Since ERISA's enactment, the question of whether a state statute
regulates insurance has often been hotly contested. 20 9 Moreover,
courts have become experts in applying, not to say manipulating, sev-
eral factors which were developed to answer this question when it
arose in the context of antitrust litigation. 2 10 This issue first arose in
205. See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002); Ky. Ass'n of
Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003); Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83 (2d
Cir. 2003); Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare Inc., 680 A.2d 127 (Conn. 1996).
206. Section 514(b)(2)(A) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000), provides that
with one exception, nothing in ERISA "shall be construed to exempt or relieve
any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or
securities."
207. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
208. Of course, as the Court noted, this mandated benefits law would not apply to
Massachusetts employers who "self-insured;" that is, undertook the financial risk
of providing health care coverage to their employees themselves, rather than by
purchasing insurance. Id. at 747 n.25. Today about one-third of Americans re-
ceive health care coverage through employers which have self-funded or self-in-
sured, and thus cannot rely on state laws designed to promote citizens' access to
high quality health care through the regulation of insurance. FURROW ET AL.,
supra note 36, at 468-69.
209. See Final Rule on Group Health Plan Claims Processing, 65 Fed. Reg. 70,246,
70,254 n.32.
210. The Supreme Court and lower courts have long struggled over how to identify
when a state law "regulates insurance." For many years, the Supreme Court re-
lied on the analytical factors used in antitrust law to determine whether a law
regulates "the business of insurance" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1011-15. See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355
(2002); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 742-47 (1985). However, the
Court's analysis has not always been a model of clarity. Acknowledging this ana-
lytical weakness in Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, the Su-
preme Court announced "a clean break from the McCarran-Ferguson factors."
Id. at 1479. The Court held that in order for a state law to be saved from ERISA
2003]
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the 1980's over the question of whether a state could mandate mini-
mum insurance benefits 2 il and then came to a head in the late 1990s,
as many states rushed to protect their citizens from what were seen as
unfair denials of care by insurers and MCOs. These states enacted
laws mandating internal and external appeals processes, which per-
mitted patients/consumers to challenge an MCO's or insurer's refusal
to provide or pay for care. Because these laws "relate[d] to" the struc-
ture and administration of an employee benefit plan, they were obvi-
ous candidates for ERISA preemption, unless they were exempted by
the insurance "savings clause."
In Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,2 12 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question of whether the Illinois independent review law
was preempted by ERISA § 514. Debra Moran sought to compel her
HMO, Rush Prudential, to submit a dispute over the medical necessity
of proposed surgery to treat her severe shoulder pain to the indepen-
dent review process dictated by Illinois law. Under the Illinois HMO
Act, in the event of a dispute over medical necessity of a particular
procedure,
Each Health Maintenance Organization shall provide a mechanism for the
timely review by a physician holding the same class of license as the primary
care physician, who is unaffiliated with the [HMO], jointly selected by the
patient..., primary care physician, and the [HMO].... In the event that the
reviewing physician determines the covered service to be medically necessary,
the [HMO] shall provide the covered service. 2 1 3
Rush Prudential refused to consent to the independent medical re-
view, and Moran chose to have the surgery performed at her own ex-
pense. She then filed suit to compel independent review and an
independent review was ordered by the state court. The independent
reviewer determined that the surgery was medically necessary, but
Rush Prudential refused to pay for it. Moran then sued for reimburse-
ment under the HMO Act in state court. Rush Prudential removed
the case to federal court, claiming that the state cause of action was
preempted by a different section of ERISA, § 502(a)(1)(B), which pro-
vides litigants with a remedy for denial of benefits due under their
employee benefit plan: either injunctive relief or the monetary value of
those benefits. The United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois held that Moran's state law claim was preempted, but
preemption as a "'law ... which regulates insurance'.. . [it] must be specifically
directed toward entities engaged in insurance ... [and] substantially affect the
risk pooling arrangement between insurer and the insured." Id.
211. In Metropolitan Life, the Court held that while a Massachusetts law mandating
minimum mental health benefits certainly "relate[d] to" an ERISA-governed
plan, it was saved because it was a law regulating "the business of insurance."
471 U.S. at 743-44.
212. 536 U.S. 355, 361 (2002).
213. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT, 125/4-10 (2000). There was a parallel provision governing
Illinois insurance companies.
[Vol. 82:508
2003] PATIENT ADVOCACY AND TERMINATION 555
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 2 14 The stage
was set for Supreme Court review.
The Supreme Court reduced an extraordinarily complex issue to
apparently simple terms. The Court agreed that the Illinois HMO Act
"relate[d] to" an employee benefit plan, 215 in this case the health cov-
erage received by Moran through her husband's employer. Yet, the
Court held that the Illinois HMO Act was not preempted by ERISA
because the statute was "saved" as a law regulating insurance. Re-
jecting Rush Prudential's argument that a law governing HMOs could
not be a law that regulates insurance, the Supreme Court ruled that
just because HMOs provided care in addition to paying for it did not
mean that the Illinois law was not a law regulating insurance, since
HMOs still operated with insurance-like features, particularly
"spreading and underwriting of a policyholder's risk."2 16 The Court
stated: "The answer to Rush is, of course, that an HMO is both: it
provides health care, and it does so as insurer. Nothing in the savings
clause requires an either-or choice between health care and insurance
in deciding a preemption question . *..."217 The Court emphasized
that Congress had understood this hybrid quality of HMOs - as both
health care provider and risk spreader - when the HMO Act of 1973
was passed,2 18 just one year before ERISA was enacted. 21 9 Further,
the Court held that requiring HMOs to comply with the state law
mandate of an independent external review would only have an indi-
rect effect on employee benefit plans, comparable to the indirect im-
pact of the hospital surcharge statute that the Court found acceptable
in Travelers.2 20 Finally, the Court found that the independent review
requirement did not create an "alternative remedy" for beneficiaries of
employee benefit plans (EBPs), which would have supplanted the ER-
214. 230 F.3d 959, 972-73.
215. 536 U.S. at 365.
216. Id. at 366. It appears that this result is consistent within the Court's reasoning
in Miller, as discussed in note 210 supra.
217. Id. at 367.
218. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 914, amended by 42
U.S.C. § 300e(c) (1994).
219. Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 368-369. Applying this understanding to the Illi-
nois HMO Act, the Court declared:
[P]rior to ERISA's passage, Congress demonstrated an awareness of
HMOs as risk-bearing organizations subject to state insurance regula-
tion, the [Illinois] state Act defines HMOs by reference to risk bearing,
HMOs have taken over much business formerly performed by traditional
indemnity insurers, and they are almost universally regulated as insur-
ers under state law. That HMOs are not traditional "indemnity" insur-
ers is no matter; "we would not undertake to freeze the concept of
'insurance'. .. into the mold they fitted when these Federal Acts were
passed."
Id. at 372-73 (citation omitted).
220. Id.
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ISA remedies available 22 1 and thus argued for preemption despite the
exception provided by the "savings clause." The Court held that the
independent review law was more akin to the requirement of a medi-
cal second opinion than the provision of an additional method for ob-
taining relief, such as the use of arbitration, which could run afoul of
the Congressional goal expressed in ERISA of having uniform na-
tional remedies for its violation.222
The result in Rush Prudential is entirely consistent with that the
Department of Labor's recently promulgated regulations, which pre-
scribe minimum standards for the processing of claims by group
health plans.2 23 The regulations' goal is to achieve more expeditious
claims processing and to ensure that claimants who are dissatisfied
with their health plans' response are able to have quick access to the
courts or available administrative remedies, including state mandated
external review processes. 22 4 The regulations also explicitly provide
that where a patient needs urgent care and therefore seeks a prompt
review of a decision to deny care, the health plan must permit a pa-
tient's treating health care professional to serve as the patient's au-
thorized representative in this appeal,2 25 recognizing the key role that
health care professionals may play in advocating for their patient's
interests. The new regulations explicitly address the preemption
question, and take a lenient approach to state laws, tilting decidedly
against preemption. The regulations declare:
(k)(1) Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede any provision of
State law that regulates insurance, except to the extent that such law pre-
vents the application of a requirement of this section.
221. ERISA § 510(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2002) enumerates available civil enforce-
ment mechanisms.
222. Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 376-84 (distinguishing Pilot Life v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41 (1987)).
223. Interestingly, the Court did not mention these regulations, despite the fact that
they had been promulgated a year and half before the Court's decision, and spe-
cificallyaddressed the preemption question. The regulations were a long time in
the making. They were initially proposed on September 9, 1998. Then, after the
Department of Labor held public hearings and received extensive comments, the
regulations were promulgated in final form on November 21, 2000, taking effect
on January 1, 2002. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 65 Fed.
Reg. 70,246 (November 21, 2000) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2560).
224. Id. at 70,246-56. ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2000), provides:
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary, every employee benefit
plan shall -
(1) provide adequate notice in writing to every participant or beneficiary
whose claim for benefits under the plan has been denied, setting forth
the specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calculated to be
understood by the participant, and
(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for
benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate
named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.
225. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b)(4) (2003).
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(2)(i) For purposes of paragraph (k)(1) . . . a State law regulating insurance
shall not be considered to prevent the application of a requirement of this sec-
tion merely because such State law establishes a review procedure to evaluate
and resolve disputes involving adverse benefit determinations under group
health plans so long as the review procedure is conducted by a person or entity
other than the insurer, the plan, plan fiduciaries, the employer, [or their em-
ployees or agents].
(ii) [C]laimants ... need not exhaust such State law procedures prior to bring-
ing suit under section 502(a) of [ERISA].226
As explained in the commentary to the regulations, the Depart-
ment of Labor's view is that state laws designed to assist consumers in
challenging a denial of care under their health plan escape preemp-
tion in two significant ways. First, as provided in paragraph (k)(1) of
the regulations, if the state law concerns the internal HMO or insur-
ance grievance process it will be preempted only if it is not possible to
comply with the state law as well as the Department of Labor regula-
tions. 22 7 Second, under paragraph (k)(2), if the state law mandates an
external appeal (i.e., one that is not administered by the insurer,
health plan, or employer), it will also not be preempted because it pro-
vides a remedy that is supplemental to the ERISA plan grievance pro-
cedure and will not preclude a claimant from bringing suit under
ERISA § 502(a).2 28 This, of course, is the interpretation given by the
Supreme Court to the Illinois independent medical review at issue in
Rush Prudential. Thus, the Supreme Court and the Department of
Labor agree that state internal and external review laws are to be
construed whenever possible to permit individuals aggrieved by a de-
cision of their insurer or health care plan to challenge those decisions
expeditiously and in multiple venues.
Viewed against this background, it appears likely that a state stat-
ute prohibiting MCOs and insurers from retaliating against HCPs
who advocate for their patients would survive a challenge based on
ERISA preemption. 2 29 For illustrative purposes, I will discuss the
226. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(k)
227. This very generous approach is captured by the following hypothetical from the
commentary to the regulations: "[A] State may have a law requiring insurers to
allow oral appeals of all claims or to decide claims within shorter periods of time.
These laws would not prevent the application of the regulation because plans
could comply with both the regulation and the State laws." Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, 65 Fed. Reg. 70,246, 70,254 (November 21, 2000)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2560).
228. See Moran, 536 U.S. at 377-84; Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 65 Fed. Reg. 70,246, 70,254 (November 21, 2000) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
2560).
229. An MCO defendant could argue that ERISA preempted the state advocacy protec-
tion law if health care through the MCO was provided as part of an employee
benefit plan, at least for the patients on whose behalf the HCP had advocated. If,
on the other hand, the protected advocacy was provided to patients who had pur-
chased coverage as an insurance policy, outside of an employment relationship,
ERISA would have no conceivable application.
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Maine advocacy protection law. 230 This law, part of a detailed statute
enumerating the "plan requirements" for health plans, is in the Maine
Insurance Code.231 The statute prohibits managed care plans from
"terminat[ing] or otherwise disciplin[ing] a participating provider be-
cause the provider advocates for medically appropriate health care" 23 2
and also prohibits plans from limiting HCPs' discussions with their
patients concerning treatment alternatives. 23 3
First, the Maine advocacy protection statute is likely to survive an
ERISA preemption challenge because the law focuses on the relation-
ship between MCOs and the HCPs who provide care under a health
plan and is, therefore does not "relate to" the terms of the plan itself.
Second, even if the "relate to" clause is implicated, the law is saved
from preemption by the insurance savings clause.2 34 In analyzing the
hospital surcharge statute at issue in Travelers, the Supreme Court
ruled that while the statute might have an "indirect" economic impact
on the costs of administering an employee benefit plan, because it
could increase the costs of providing services to enrollees depending on
the type of plan involved, that impact was too remote for the statute to
be seen as "relat[ing] to" an employee benefit plan. 23 5 Here too, I sug-
gest that a statute that limits an MCO's ability to retaliate against a
participating HCP has too tenuous and indirect an impact to be con-
sidered to "relate to" an EBP, even though the statute might make it
more expensive for MCOs to provide services if they could not use the
threat (or the reality) of retaliation against HCPs to reduce the overall
costs of providing heath care services to their enrollees.236
But even if an advocacy protection statute were found to "relate to"
an EBP because of its effects on the structure and administration of
that plan, the statute should be saved from preemption by the insur-
ance "savings clause," because the statute clearly regulates insurance
under the test announced in Kentucky Association of Health Plans.2 37
230. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4303.
231. See text accompanying notes 79-80.
232. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4303(3).
233. The statute also mandates additional requirements for health plans, including
provisions regarding enrollee rights and remedies, HCP credentialing rules, pro-
cedural due process protections for HCPs whose contracts may be terminated or
not renewed, and restrictions on financial incentives to HCPs to limit medically
necessary care. Id.
234. ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
235. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 645.
236. But see Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller, 123 Sup. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2003) (dis-
cussing the economic consequences of Kentucky's AWP laws - to increase the
costs of healthcare coverage to consumers - but concluding that because the
"AWP prohibition substantially affects the type of risk pooling arrangements that
insurers may offer it is saved from ERISA preemption by the insurance savings
clause.")
237. Id. at 1479.
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First, the law is "specifically directed toward entities engaged in in-
surance, as if it applies to "carrier[s] offering a health plan in this
state," and is part of the Maine Insurance Code.238 Second, the stat-
ute includes multiple provisions about the spreading and underwrit-
ing of risk, which, as explained by the Court in Kentucky Association
of Health Plans, "substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement be-
tween the insurer and the insured."239 These include rules about the
adequacy of the managed care network to ensure reasonable access to
health care,240 prohibitions on certain financial incentives, 241 griev-
ance procedures for enrollees,242 provisions regarding standing refer-
rals to specialists for enrollees with chronic conditions, 2 43 and
provisions to ensure continuity of care.2 44 Importantly, all these pro-
visions are either risk-spreading or risk-underwriting, thereby meet-
ing the requirements of the insurance savings clause.
Further, holding that state advocacy protection laws are not pre-
empted by ERISA is consistent with the Department of Labor's inter-
nal appeal regulations, which recognize that a treating HCP is often
in the best position to advocate for her patients, and must be permit-
ted to serve as the patient's representative where the patient's medi-
cal condition requires urgent treatment.2 45 The central purpose of
these regulations is to guarantee compliance with the mandate of ER-
ISA section 503 and ensure that claims of denials of care due under
employee benefit plans are resolved accurately and expeditiously. 246
It therefore makes eminent sense to uphold state laws that effectuate
the spirit of these regulations, by forbidding MCO punishment of
HCPs for doing what is mandated by professional ethics and common
law.
A contrary holding would also be inconsistent with the rationale of
the Supreme Court's decision in Pegram v. Herdrich, the first Su-
preme Court decision to consider ERISA's implications for managed
care. 2 47 While Pegram was not addressing a question of ERISA pre-
emption, the Court nonetheless explained its view that in enacting
ERISA, Congress had drawn a distinction between quality of care is-
sues, which were reserved to the states, and quantity of care (or ade-
quacy of benefits) issues, for which Congress sought to provide a
238. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 24-A, § 4303.
239. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 536 U.S. 355, 355 (2002).
240. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4303(1).
241. Id. at § 4303(3-B).
242. Id. at § 4303(4).
243. Id. at § 4303(6).
244. Id. at §4303(7).
245. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b)(4) (2001).
246. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 65 Fed. Reg. 70,246, 70,246-
56 (November 21, 2000) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2560).
247. 531 U.S. 211 (2000).
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uniform federal remedy under ERISA § 502. In Pegram, a plaintiff
sued her physician (and the HMO of which the doctor was part-
owner), alleging that the physician was a "plan administrator" under
ERISA and thus had a fiduciary duty to patients/plan enrollees under
ERISA § 404.248 The plaintiffs appendix had burst while she was
awaiting an appointment for an ultrasound. She alleged that the phy-
sician had delayed appropriate diagnostic procedures because she had
a financial incentive to have the procedures performed in-network,
and that this incentive scheme had caused the physician to breach her
ERISA fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty to the plaintiff, an EBP en-
rollee.249 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that, in
contrast to "traditional trustees," whose business usually involve fi-
nancial accountability, physicians who allocate diagnostic and treat-
ment resources to particular patients under an HMO plan are not
acting as ERISA fiduciaries under § 404.250 Instead, the Court found
that such physicians are making "mixed [benefits] eligibility and
treatment decisions." 25 1 The Court suggested that an alternative
holding would be impossible, since the only way an HMO physician
could defend against a breach of fiduciary duty claim would be to ar-
gue that she had not erred in her diagnosis or treatment decisions,
and this, of course, would involve the domain of state medical mal-
practice law, with which Congress and the federal judiciary were loath
to interfere. 25 2 The Court found that Congress could not have in-
tended such a result, since the federal HMO Act, designed to promote
the development of HMOs, was enacted only a few months before
ERISA.253
This reasoning was recently invoked by the Second Circuit in its
decision in Cicio v. Does.254 There the majority held that the plain-
tiffs state law claim that the medical director of an HMO had engaged
in medical malpractice when he rejected the course of treatment re-
quested by an HMO enrollee's physician was not preempted by ER-
ISA, since the physician's actions in deciding what medical care was
appropriate for the patient/enrollee were precisely the type of "mixed
eligibility and treatment decision" involved in Pegram.2 55
Several state courts have also taken the view that Congress did not
intend broad ERISA preemption of state laws that regulate the prac-
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 228-32.
252. Id. at 235-37
253. Id. at 232-330.
254. 321 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003).
255. Id. at 104. Judge Calabresi dissented in part, arguing that while the court may
have done justice for the injured plaintiff, its reasoning could not be squared with
Supreme Court precedent and the ERISA preemption framework. Id. at 106.
[Vol. 82:508560
2003] PATIENT ADVOCACY AND TERMINATION 561
tice of medicine and the delivery of health care services, including
MCO-HCP relations. In Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare of Connecti-
cut, Inc.,2 56 the Connecticut Supreme Court considered a suit brought
by physicians who had been terminated by a "preferred provider"
health plan, allegedly in violation of Connecticut statutory and com-
mon law.2 57 The court rejected the defendant's contention that the
physicians claims were preempted by ERISA because they all "re-
late[d] to" an employee benefit plan. 25s Citing Travelers, the court
held that "because the claims raised by the plaintiffs do not affect or
prescribe the establishment, administration, regulation or mainte-
nance of an employee benefit plan, but, rather, merely seek to enforce
the plan that CIGNA has chosen to create and administer, the claims
do not 'relate to' employee benefit plans. ... 259
Similarly, in Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, the New York Court
of Appeals held that the plaintiffs claims for medical malpractice,
breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract against her husband's
physician, based on alleged misdiagnosis and failure to promptly refer
him to a specialist, were not preempted by ERISA.260 The physician
defended against these claims on the ground that because he was act-
ing under contract to an HMO, his actions were mandated by the rules
of the employee's benefit plan, and therefore governed by ERISA
rather than state law. The Court of Appeals disagreed, invoking the
Supreme Court's presumption in Travelers "that Congress does not in-
tend to supplant State law," particularly in fields of traditional state
regulation.261 The court held that the mere fact that the physician
had to comply with the HMO's administrative rules in fulfilling his
patient obligations did not transform alleged "violations of ... [his]
duty of care into claims that 'relate to' ERISA plan administration."26 2
Thus, the plaintiffs claims were not preempted. 26 3
256. 680 A.2d 127 (Conn. 1996). The plaintiffs brought claims under breach of con-
tract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious inter-
ference with business expectancies, and violations of the Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practices Act (CUPTA) and a recently enacted Act Concerning Managed
Care. The suit was a companion to one filed by the physicians' patients, who
brought suit based on alleged misrepresentations by CIGNA and the lack of con-
tinuity of care in treatment occasioned by the physicians' termination from the
health plan. Id. at 131-32.
257. Id. at 133.
258. Id. at 136.
259. Id.
260. 711 N.E.2d 621, 623 (N.Y. 1999).
261. Id. at 624 (citing to N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Trav-
elers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654-55).
262. Id. at 625.
263. Id. at 625-26.
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Most recently, in Pappas v. Asbel, 264 the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania relied on Pegram to hold that a suit challenging an HMO
physician's decision to deny plaintiff emergency transfer to an aca-
demic medical center involved precisely the sort of "mixed eligibility
and treatment decision" that Pegram suggested would not be pre-
empted by ERISA.265 The court held that the plaintiffs claim for
medical negligence could go forward. 266
Applying these precedents to the case of an HCP who is deselected
from an MCO, I suggest that if a physician's decisions about resource
allocation (e.g., referral for diagnosis and treatment) are not pre-
empted by ERISA, then surely an HCP's actions in advocating for a
patient to receive such resources, i.e. necessary medical care, should
likewise not be preempted. Since the regulation of medicine and other
health care professions has long been in the domain of state law, a
statute that explicitly protects the common law fiduciary duty to advo-
cate should not be preempted by ERISA.
2. Medicare Managed Care Preemption
In addition to facing the hurdle of ERISA preemption, health care
professionals who treat Medicare patients in a managed care setting
may also meet a defense of preemption under the regulations gov-
erning "Medicare + C" or "Medicare Choice" plans. While these regu-
lations are generally supportive of HCPs' advocacy, the remedies they
provide are not as extensive as those of some state advocacy protection
laws. In addition, HCPs who treat both Medicare Choice patients and
other patients could be compelled to pursue both a state statutory
cause of action and Medicare administrative relief simultaneously. 26 7
Following a Congressional mandate, 268 the Medicare Choice regu-
lations require many procedural protections for HCPs who participate
264. Pappas II, 768 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2001) (affirming its original decision in Pappas I,
724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rendered its decision
in Pappas Il on remand from the Supreme Court's granting of certiorari, sub
nom. U.S. Healthcare System of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Hospital In-
surance Co., 530 U.S. 1241 (2000), in which the Court granted certiorari, vacated
the judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Pegram
v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
265. Pappas II, 768 A.2d at 1096.
266. Id.
267. A third wrinkle is also possible. Some persons enrolled in a Medicare Choice plan
also receive benefits under an ERISA plan, pursuant to a separate arrangement
between the Medicare Choice organization and an employer or employee organi-
zation. Claims for denial of these benefits would have to be pursued under ER-
ISA rules (which might permit resort to state law, as discussed above), rather
than the Medicare Choice regulations. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE BENEFIT CLAIMS PROCEDURE REGULATION A-2, at httpJ/
www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs-claims-proc-reg.html (last visited July 18, 2003).
268. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(w)(21) - (27) (2002).
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in a Medicare Choice plan, including rules for HCP credentialing,269 a
process for appealing adverse participation decisions,2 70 notice and
hearing prior to suspension or termination,2 7 1 and a formal mecha-
nism for MCO-physician consultation about clinical and management
issues.272 The regulations also mandate extensive appeal and griev-
ance procedures for MCO enrollees (patients) who want to challenge a
denial of care. 2 73 As with many state managed care statutes, the reg-
ulations also place limits on permissible financial incentives for
HCPs.274 The regulations further provide that MCOs may not pro-
hibit or restrict an HCP from advising or advocating on behalf of en-
rollees. 27 5 However, the regulations do not provide a direct remedy
for an HCP who is terminated or suspended because of such
advocacy. 276
Thus, a deselected HCP invoking a state advocacy protection stat-
ute might well face a defense by the MCO that the law is preempted
by Medicare Choice regulations. The answer provided by the regula-
tions is not particularly helpful. The regulations first state a general
preemption rubric: that the rules supersede otherwise applicable state
laws "only to the extent that such State laws are inconsistent with the
standards established under this part."2 77 However, the regulations
also carve out certain areas for explicit preemption, including
"[riequirements relating to [the] inclusion or treatment of providers
and suppliers."2 78 Looking just at the general preemption provision,
one might argue that it should be interpreted similarly to the Depart-
ment of Labor external appeal regulations, which permit state reme-
269. 42 C.F.R. § 422.204 (2002).
270. 42 C.F.R. § 422.202(a) (2002).
271. Id. at § 422.202(d).
272. Id. at § 422.202(b).
273. If an enrollee is dissatisfied with the results of his appeal, he may seek review by
an administrative law judge if the amount in controversy is greater than $100.
Under certain circumstances, the administrative law judge's decision may be re-
viewed by a Departmental Appeals Board and, ultimately, a federal court. 42
C.F.R §§ 422.600-.616 (2002). Medicare Choice regulations have recently been
promulgated to permit enrollees to expeditiously challenge a Medicare managed
care organization's decision to terminate provider services. Improvements to the
Medicare+Choice Appeal and Grievance Procedures; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg.
16,652, 16,667 (Apr. 4, 2003) (codified as 42 C.F.R. Parts 422 and 489).
274. 42 C.F.R. § 422.210 (2002).
275. 42 C.F.R. § 422.206 (2002).
276. Of course, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) always have
the power to exclude a MCO from the Medicare Choice program, if its violations
of Medicare regulations are serious and frequent enough. 42 C.F.R. §§ 422.206,
.750-.758 (2002).
277. 42 C.F.R. § 422.402(a) (2002).
278. Id. at § 422.402(b). In addition, these rules are not to be interpreted to affect the
impact of any other law that might have preemptive effect, presumably a refer-
ence to ERISA. Id. at § 422.402(c).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
dies to co-exist with the Department's regulations, if there is no direct
conflict.2 79 However, the second, specific preemption rule appears dis-
positive, as it clearly states that relations between the MCO and its
providers and suppliers are to be governed by the regulations alone.
3. Procedural Enforcement Obstacles
a. Does the Statute Create a Private Cause of Action?
The first question that may be faced by a deselected HCP is
whether a state advocacy protection statute creates a private right of
action. 28 0 While all of the explicit advocacy protection statutes are
silent on this point, in every case in which a statute has been invoked,
the courts have found that the statute does create a private right of
action. In one case in which physicians challenged their termination
from a managed care plan for non-advocacy reasons, a state court has
also held that the provider protection statute created a private right of
action. 28 1 In regard to state statutes which provide supplemental
support for health care professional advocacy, the record is mixed.
One state, New Mexico, explicitly provides a private right of action for
any person who is injured by "[the] violation of a right protected pur-
suant to ... the Patient Protection Act."282 However, provider protec-
tion statutes in two states, Delaware and Maryland, expressly declare
that they do not create a private right of action.28 3
In several recent decisions, courts have been emphatic that state
laws protecting health care professional advocacy, or protecting HCPs
in a managed care arena more generally, must be interpreted to give
HCPs a private cause of action, so that they may have a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. In Lewis v. Individual Practice Ass'n of West-
ern New York, Inc.,28 4 a New York trial court held that a physician
who asserted that his contract with an HMO was not renewed because
of patient advocacy could seek judicial relief based on a New York ad-
vocacy protection statute.28 5 Pointing to a legislative intent to
279. See text accompanying notes 226-28 supra.
280. Without a private right of action, a deselected HCP has much less power, having
been compelled to rely on a complex and often overburdened bureaucracy for
vindication.
281. Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 680 A.2d 127, 146 (Conn. 1996).
282. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-57-9 (2001).
283. Delaware and Maryland are the only states that explicitly disclaim creating a
cause of action for individual litigants based on the health care professional pro-
tections they provide. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 3339(h); MD. CODE ANN. § 19-
710(s)(3).
284. 723 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
285. Id. at 847-48 (quoting N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 4406-d(5) (McKinney 2002)). That
statute provides:
No health care plan shall terminate a contract or employment, or refuse
to renew a contract, solely because a health care provider has:
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"remed[y] ... the termination or non-renewal of health care providers
for advocating on behalf of their patients,"28 6 the court held that it
must interpret the statute generously.
Lewis' reasoning was found persuasive in Foong v. Empire Blue
Cross & Blue Shield,287 which involved a different section of the same
New York provider protection statute.28 8 Dr. Foong, who was termi-
nated from Empire's managed care network due to an alleged threat of
"imminent harm" to patients, challenged his termination. Foong ar-
gued that Empire had terminated him due to a billing dispute over the
medical necessity of certain procedures, and, rather than giving him a
chance to respond, had mislead the state insurance department into
dropping its administrative review of the case.28 9 The court concluded
that "providing a private right of action in this case ... is necessary to
give substance to .. .[the statute]."290 The court observed:
[T]he Legislature... sought to afford health care providers the ability to chal-
lenge the decisions of HMOs to terminate their contracts .... [The statute]
will become meaningless if Empire is able to strip away the due process pro-
tections given to health care providers terminated from its plan. Empire's de-
cision to terminate Foong from its plan without following the steps delineated
in the statue and its subsequent action, preventing Foong from seeking ad-
ministrative relief, opened the door for the courts to enter.2 9 1
In Khajavi v. Feather River Anesthesia Medical Group, a California
appellate court gave that state's advocacy protection statute an expan-
sive interpretation to ensure that the legislature's purpose in enacting
the statute was given effect.292 Khajavi was an anesthesiologist who
became embroiled in a dispute with a surgeon over the appropriate-
ness of administering anesthesia to a patient whom Khajavi deemed
unstable. The surgeon's brother was a partner in the medical group
which employed Khajavi, and the group terminated Khajavi's employ-
ment shortly after the incident. Khajavi brought suit under the Cali-
(a) advocated on behalf of an enrollee;
(b) filed a complaint against the health care plan;
(c) appealed a decision of the health care plan;
(d) provided information or filed a report pursuant to... [the N.Y. exter-
nal appeals procedure]; or
(e) requested a hearing or review pursuant to this section.
286. Lewis, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
287. N.Y. First Judicial District, Justice Ramos, Oct. 9, 2002, N.Y.L.J. Oct. 11, 2002,
p.29, affd Foong v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 762 N.Y.S.2d 348 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2003).
288. N.Y. Pub. Health L. § 4406-d.
289. Foong, 762 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
290. Id. Although the court was no doubt influenced by Empire's alleged deliberate
misrepresentations to the state insurance department, the court's ruling ac-
knowledged the central truth that if the legislation were not interpreted to per-
mit individual litigants to sue, the statute would be rendered ineffectual.
291. Id.
292. 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 673-41 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
fornia advocacy protection statute.2 9 3 The defendants claimed that
Khajavi's actions were not the sort of advocacy the Legislature had
envisioned in passing the law, citing the statute's explicit reference to
Wickline, 29 4 which had addressed the duty to advocate against a third
party payor that tried to limit care. 2 95 The appellate court disagreed,
holding that the statute's application was not limited to the context of
Wickline. 29 6 The court found that the statute's goal was to encourage
physicians "to advocate for medically appropriate health care"29 7 in
two settings: "(1) an appeal from a payor's decision to deny payment,
and (2) a protest of a decision, policy, or practice that the physician
reasonably believes impairs his or her ability to provide medically
[necessary] care."2 9 s The court ruled that Khajavi's cause of action,
which fell squarely within this second advocacy context, permitted his
suit to proceed.
In Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc., the Con-
necticut Supreme Court held that a state law establishing procedural
safeguards for physicians in MCOs must be construed to create a pri-
vate cause of action, despite the statute's silence on the question. 29 9
The physician plaintiffs claimed that they were improperly termi-
nated from a health care network and a group of patient plaintiffs sep-
arately claimed that they had been harmed by the lack of continuity of
care when their physicians were terminated from the network. The
court used the criteria announced by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash
to determine whether a private remedy should be implied in a statute
that did not address the question.300 Three factors were deemed
pertinent:
First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose . benefit the statute was
enacted ... ? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?... Third, is it consis-
293. Id. at 635 (quoting CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2056 (West 2003)).
294. Id. at 639 (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2056(a) (West 2003)). Section 2056(a)
provides that: "The purpose of this section is to provide protection against retalia-
tion for physicians who advocate for medically appropriate health care for their
patients pursuant to Wickline v. State of California, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630."
295. See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra, discussing the facts and holding of
Wickline.
296. The court relied on the statutory bill analyses, which made "clear that the bill's
reference to Wickline was only intended to refer to the responsibility of physicians
to advocate for medically appropriate health care for their patients, not to limit
the statute's protections to the facts of Wickline." Khajavi, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
640.
297. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2056(b) (West 2003).
298. Khajavi, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 638.
299. 680 A.2d 127, 145-46 (Conn. 1996).
300. Id. at 145 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
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tent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a
remedy for the plaintiff?3 0 1
Here, the court held that the statute was indeed enacted for the
benefit of physicians and patients, permitting the former to determine
whether they met the plan's credentialing criteria and the latter to
decide whether or not to enroll in the plan. Although the statute was
silent on the question of a private right of action, the court found that
it was consistent with the statutory purpose of protecting physicians
and patients to permit a private cause of action.30 2 As in Lewis and
Foong, the court found that a contrary interpretation would leave the
injured parties without redress and would render the statute useless.
It thus appears that courts are likely to construe state advocacy
protection laws to permit private causes of action, even where the
statutes are not artfully drafted or do not address the issue. Although
there has been at trend among federal courts to be more hesitant to
infer a private cause of action, 30 3 state courts are still likely to find
that their legislatures meant to protect patients and HCPs from over-
reaching by insurers and MCOs and will permit aggrieved health care
professionals their day in court.
B. Burdens of Production and Persuasion
The next sections will address the issues of how the HCP will make
its case: what must he prove, and how will he prove it? In deciding
how an HCP might demonstrate that he was deselected by an MCO
because of patient advocacy, one of the most difficult issues is the allo-
cation of the burdens of production and persuasion. The only case to
directly address this point is Lewis v. Individual Practice Ass'n of
Western New York.304 The plaintiff surgeon, who had a ten year rela-
tionship with the defendants, a physician practice association and the
HMO with which it was affiliated, sued after the defendants chose not
to renew his contract. Under the New York health care provider pro-
tection statute, health care plans3 05 must provide HCPs with procedu-
301. Id. at 145. The Connecticut Supreme Court determined that the fourth Cort v.
Ash factor, "'whether the cause of action [is] one traditionally relegated to state
law ... so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on
federal law?'" was inapposite. Id. at 145 n.23 (alteration in original) (quoting
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78).
302. Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 680 A.2d 127, 146 (Conn. 1996).
303. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 358 (2d ed. 1994) (finding a
trend "for the Supreme Court to be less willing to create private rights of action");
Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action and Remedies: An Integrated Ap-
proach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67, 90-91 (2001) (discussing the Supreme Court's in-
creasingly restrictive criteria for creating a private right of action).
304. 723 N.Y.S.2d 845, 850-51 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
305. The statute defines health care plans to include HMOs and independent practice
associations. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4406-d(8) (McKinney 2002).
2003]
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ral due process protections, including notice of the health plan's
credentialing and profiling criteria, 30 6 and notice and an opportunity
for a hearing prior to termination, 30 7 and are prohibited from penaliz-
ing HCPs for their advocacy. The statute provides that "[n]o health
care plan shall terminate a contract ... or refuse to renew a contract,
solely because a health care provider has (a) advocated on behalf of an
enrollee."308 In this case, the defendants claimed that once they gave
plaintiff the required sixty days' notice that his contract would not be
renewed, they had satisfied their statutory obligations, since the stat-
ute provided explicitly that a "non-renewal shall not constitute a ter-
mination for purposes of this section."30 9 The defendants also argued
that even if some hearing was required, once a health plan offered
some reason for not renewing the HCP's contract other than advocacy,
no further challenge was possible. 3 10
The court disagreed. It found that the only way to effectuate the
statute's purpose - to prohibit "managed care entities from preventing
providers from advocating on behalf of patients or disclosing to pa-
tients appropriate information concerning their care"3 11 - was to pro-
vide deselected HCPs with a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate
that their advocacy activities played a role in the health plan's deci-
sion not to renew the contract. The court rejected the defendants' ar-
gument that the statute's use of the term "solely" meant that the
statute could be violated only if "patient advocacy [was] the one and
only reason for non-renewal."312 The court held that the Legislature
had not intended "to allow HMOs to avoid compliance with the patient
advocacy provision by simply pointing to other provider deficiencies,
whether real or fabricated, significant or insignificant, as a pretense
for punishing a provider through termination or non-renewal for en-
gaging in a protected activity."3 13
Drawing upon New York employment discrimination law for an
analogy, the court ruled that a plaintiff HCP carries the initial burden
306. Id. at § 4406-d(1), (4).
307. Id. at § 4406-d(2).
308. Id. § 4406-d(5) (emphasis added). In addition to its general protection of HCPs
who "advocated on behalf of an enrollee," the statute also protects those who:
(b) filed a complaint against the health care plan,
(c) appealed a decision of the health care plan;
(d) provided information or filed a report pursuant to ... [the New York
external review process]; or
(e) requested a hearing or review pursuant to this section.
Id.
309. Lewis, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 847 (quoting N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 4406-d(3) (McKin-
ney 2002)).
310. Id. at 848.
311. Id. at 849 (quoting N.Y. State Educ. Dep't recommendation of the Act).
312. Id. at 848.
313. Id. at 849.
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of production, as he "must show that he engaged in the protected ac-
tivity of patient advocacy and that his contract was not renewed."3 14
If he does this, "the burden shifts to the defendant to show other valid
reasons for the non-renewal."3 15 Finally, once the defendant does
this, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff,
[who] must show that the reasons given were simply a pretense for not re-
newing the contract based on patient advocacy and that the reasons given
would not alone or in combination have led to non-renewal such that patient
advocacy became the sole determining factor in the decision not to renew the
contract. As evidence ... the plaintiff can demonstrate that others who were
similarly situated and who did not engage in the protected activity were
treated differently, i.e., their contracts were renewed.3 1 6
In order to evaluate whether the reasons given for nonrenewal are
real or pretextual, the plaintiff can rely on the HCP profiling criteria
which the statute requires the health plan to disclose as part of its
ongoing relationships with its health care providers, to permit the
plaintiff to compare his performance under the plan's criteria with
those of other HCPs. Ultimately, the burden of persuading the trier of
fact "that patient advocacy was the determining factor in a non-re-
newal decision" rests with the plaintiff.3 17
The court's decision in Lewis is significant in seeing the relation-
ship between an HCP and an MCO as more than a business relation-
ship because of the important public interest in ensuring that HCPs
act as fiduciaries for their patients. The decision follows the lead of
the California Supreme Court's decision in Potvin v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co.318 and the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision in
Harper v. Healthsource New Hampshire, Inc.,3 19 both of which in-
sisted that deselected HCPs be given a meaningful opportunity to
challenge the grounds for the health plan's decision. Second, Lewis
recognizes the elusive and complex nature of the truth about why a
health plan might choose to terminate an HCP, including the reality
that an HCP might be a strong patient advocate and a poor clinician,
or a person who refuses to accept the basic principles of cost-contain-
ment, or a person who makes referrals out of vested personal or finan-
cial interest. The court does not consider protected patient advocacy
to be the trump card for all HCPs whose relationship with an MCO is
ended, but establishes a thoughtful mechanism for each party to a dis-
pute to shed light on the reasons for the break-up. Third, the court
connects its analysis of the burdens of production and persuasion with
the discovery process, recognizing that if a plaintiff is denied access to
314. Id. at 850.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 851.
317. Id. at 850-51.
318. 997 P.2d 1153, 1159-61 (Cal. 2000).
319. 674 A.2d 962, 966-67 (N.H. 1996).
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information that is critical to making his case, he will not be able to go
forward. 320
C. Discovery
In order to prevail on a claim that the HCP was terminated or non-
renewed because of patient advocacy, the lawyer will first have to
gather background information about the MCO's credentialing,
recredentialing, and utilization review criteria for all HCPs belonging
to the MCO's network or health plan, looking at the criteria used
when the HCP first entered a contractual relationship with the MCO
and when the HCP was deselected. The credentialing and recreden-
tialing criteria establish important minimum standards. The utiliza-
tion review, practice guidelines, and/or practice profile data used by
the MCO in evaluating its participating HCPs set a baseline for evalu-
ating the performance of the HCP client compared to other similarly
situated HCPs in this MCO. Industry, trade group, and relevant ac-
crediting association standards for credentialing and practice profiling
should also be requested. Throughout the discovery process, the
plaintiffs requests should focus on the standards and internal plan
mechanisms applicable to the HCP's clinical specialty. While the
MCO may resist disclosure of much of this information on the ground
that it constitutes confidential business or proprietary information, in
many states, this data is required to be disclosed, either by the advo-
cacy protection statute itself,32 1 or by other statutes establishing pro-
cedural safeguards for HCPs.322 In Lewis, for example, the court
noted the defendants' "insistence that the statute did not intend to
invade the daily business decisions of the HMOs,"323 but ruled that
"the patient advocdcy protections clearly carve out one specific excep-
tion to this general laissez-faire rule. Without reliance on the objec-
tive criteria for provider performance in Public Health Law Section
4406-d(4), the protections contained in the patient advocacy section of
the law become virtually unenforceable."324 Further protection may
be provided by insisting that confidential information be disclosed in
an in camera proceeding, or by limiting the attorneys to whom disclo-
sure may be made.
In addition, the HCP's lawyer should seek to discover all informa-
tion that would give a complete picture of how the MCO and its sub-
contractors interact with HCPs that are part of its network. This
includes information that might suggest bias in utilization review or
320. Lewis, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
321. See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4406-d (4) (McKinney 2002).
322. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A § 4303 (2002 Supp.) and statutes dis-
cussed supra in section V.A.
323. 723 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
324. Id.
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HCP profiling, such as information concerning the structure of pay-
ments made by the MCO to utilization review personnel and others
who evaluate the performance of individual HCPs, to learn the incen-
tives that may influence non-providers in making utilization review
decisions and evaluating HCPs. In order to avoid being blindsided
later, the lawyer should also request information concerning any pro-
cedures the MCO has in place to assist HCPs to be more efficient and
to achieve greater compliance with the MCO's practice guidelines. In
all aspects of this background discovery, the lawyer should strive to
identify relevant decisionmakers - those who developed and/or imple-
mented criteria and their enforcement mechanisms - and the meet-
ings at which such decisions were made, so that the decisionmakers
can be deposed and documents requested.
The second aspect of discovery focuses on the special circumstances
of the plaintiff HCP. Here, the plaintiffs lawyer will seek to discover
evidence of any conduct by the plaintiff that might constitute pro-
tected patient advocacy, such as records of letters written and phone
calls made by the HCP to challenge an MCO decision to limit or delay
care. 325 Further, the plaintiff should request copies of communica-
tions regarding the HCP between the MCO and regulatory agencies or
government prosecutors, in order to understand fully the reasons why
he was deselected. The lawyer should also request individual utiliza-
tion review and practice profile data for the plaintiff and other HCPs
who may be similarly situated. These would include information such
as case mix, efficiency index, per capita patient costs, financial per-
formance, withhold calculations, referral data, and other professional
profile and resource utilization data. Although it is likely that the
MCO will resist providing any of this data, citing its own business
needs and the confidentiality interests of the other HCPs, the plaintiff
might ask that the data be transmitted in the aggregate, without any
individual provider identifiers, since the goal is simply to establish
whether or not the HCP is an "outlier" in clinical practice, to deter-
mine if deselection was based on advocacy as opposed to other, permis-
sible reasons. Again, the Lewis court endorses a pragmatic approach
to discovery, recognizing that this request is the only way that a
deselected physician can meet the burden of proof.3 2 6 The plaintiff
may also request the names of other deselected HCPs and the reasons
for their deselection, but this information is less likely to be provided
because of the confidentiality concerns noted. In regard to each type
of information sought, the plaintiff should seek all underlying statisti-
cal data, as well as memoranda, meeting dates and notes, the identity
of all people involved, and any other written and oral communications.
325. Of course, what constitutes protected advocacy will vary with the terms of the
advocacy protection statute.
326. 723 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
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1. Practical Burdens of Litigation
Simply to articulate the potential avenues of discovery make it
clear that a deselected HCP seeking to challenge the actions of an
MCO faces an expensive uphill battle. It is therefore critical for the
lawyer representing an HCP to have a clear understanding of the cli-
ent's goals, which undoubtedly reflect a complex mix of personal, pro-
fessional, and economic concerns on the client's part. The client could
be seeking reinstatement, declaratory or injunctive relief, as well as
money damages.
A health care professional has a strong incentive to fight a deselec-
tion decision, because of its enormous long-term consequences for the
HCP's income, ego, and reputation. An MCO's action in ending its re-
lationship with an HCP can often have a crippling economic domino
effect. As the MCO's decision becomes known to state or federal regu-
latory bodies as well as other insurers or health plans, an HCP, partic-
ularly one who is a specialist, can quickly face a sharp fall-off in
referrals from other HCPs.327 In other cases, an HCP's hospital staff
privileges can be threatened. 3 28 Without referrals and privileges, the
HCP's income may be slashed drastically. In addition, some lawyers
for HCPs have suggested that statutes designed to ensure due process
for HCPs may have unintended negative consequences, since by forc-
ing an MCO to provide procedural due process, the termination of an
HCP's contract becomes an adverse action, reportable to a state licens-
ing board or a national health practitioner data banks if it raises a
concern about the HCP's competency or integrity.3 29
At the same time, although one should not automatically view
every dispute between a deselected HCP and an MCO as a David and
Goliath struggle, rather than a dispute between two evenly matched
business entities, in many cases it is likely that the MCO commands
significantly greater resources than an individual HCP and can afford
to wage a war of attrition, thus making it extremely difficult for an
HCP to prevail. Individual litigants may have a particularly difficult
time, while class actions or other suits challenging the systemic as-
327. But see Potvin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 997 P.2d 1153, 1160-61 (Cal. 2000) (recog-
nizing that elimination from a plan can significantly impair a provider's ability to
practice medicine in a specific locale).
328. See, e.g., Wagner v. Magellan Health Servs., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 673, 677-79
(N.D. Ill. 2000).
329. Indeed, some lawyers have suggested that statutes mandating due process may,
in a close case, push a MCO into describing a HCP's deselection as being based on
quality of care or competency concerns, in an effort to ensure that the MCO meets
its reporting obligations. Other lawyers disagree, suggesting that most MCOs
would rather wait until a HCP's contract term expires, and simply not renew the
contract, rather than initiate what could be a protracted administrative or judi-
cial battle. See text accompanying notes 66-73 supra.
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pects of an MCO may be more successful.33 0 A defendant MCO can
exert tremendous leverage by prolonging the discovery process: mak-
ing its own discovery requests, seeking a protective order, and/or pos-
sibly engaging in dilatory tactics in regard to the plaintiffs discovery
requests. The client is of course handicapped by the very fact of his
injury - he would probably not be suing if he had not just lost a sub-
stantial fraction of his income because of the MCO's decision not to
continue his contract, but that unpleasant economic reality renders it
harder to prosecute the case, unless he has significant capital availa-
ble from an earlier, more successful time in his career. This also puts
enormous pressure on HCPs to settle, whatever the merits of their
case, because the stakes are so high.
VI. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE ADVOCACY PROTECTION LAWS -
IS MORE NEEDED?
If we view one function of law as telling stories, then the recently
enacted advocacy protection laws and the cases in which they have
been invoked by deselected HCPs may serve as important morality
plays, illuminating changes in the legal landscape for providing health
care services. Three cases have been decided in the last two years
under state laws protecting HCPs in the managed care setting: Lewis,
Foong, and Khajavi. The Lewis case is particularly significant be-
cause of the court's careful effort to make the New York advocacy pro-
tection statute operational, both in terms of articulating the shifting
burdens of production and persuasion, and in addressing concrete is-
sues in discovery, which are likely to be outcome determinative.
These cases may be seen as part of a larger trend toward providing
deselected HCPs with their day in court. 3 31 State court judges are
acknowledging that the relationship between HCPs and MCOs is both
330. It is important to note that an increasing number of suits challenging the sys-
temic actions of MCOs against patients and health care professionals have been
brought, with some success. See, e.g., Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 680
A.2d 127 (Conn. 1996) (holding that doctors' and patients' claims for violation of
state laws governing MCOs are not preempted by ERISA and may go forward);
see also In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2002)
(permitting class action suits brought by physicians and state medical societies
challenging MCO reimbursement schemes to go forward and rejecting the appli-
cation of mandatory arbitration provisions) rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Pacificare Health Sys. Inc. v. Book, 123 S. Ct. 1531 (2003) (holding that it was
premature to conclude that arbitration clauses would preclude the awarding of
treble damages under RICO, and that therefore, the proper course was to compel
arbitration); Penn. Psychiatric Soc'y v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d
278 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that psychiatrists might be able to establish third-
party standing on behalf of their patients to challenge alleged denials of care by
defendant MCOs).
331. The plaintiffs in the Harper, Napoletano, Potvin, and Schulze cases were also
successful in getting a trial or other meaningful opportunity to challenge either
the process or the criteria by which they were terminated, even though they did
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unequal and freighted with a public trust, and are trying to create a
more level playing field on which to adjudicate problems in that
relationship. 3 32
At the same time, if we truly want health care professionals to be
able to fulfill their fiduciary duty to their patients, and advocate for
them to receive medically necessary and appropriate care in a timely
fashion, both federal and state governments must make it easier for
HCPs to challenge denials or delays in care. An ideal first step would
be to amend ERISA to provide an expanded administrative review
process that would work, consistent with the recently promulgated in-
ternal appeals regulations, to permit HCPs to be the designated repre-
sentative of patients in all challenged denials of care, rather than the
current narrow limitation for urgent care situations.
In addition, since less than half of Americans receive their health
care through ERISA-governed plans, it is necessary to push for ex-
panded state laws that define protected patient advocacy in clear
terms, while providing express protections for HCPs who engage in
such advocacy, including explicit provisions to make it possible to
challenge MCOs who penalize HCPs for engaging in patient advocacy.
Both administrative and judicial remedies should be provided. Sim-
plified administrative procedures would make it easier and less costly
for HCPs to contest actions by an MCO that the HCPs believe is in
retaliation for advocacy, and would also permit a state department of
insurance or managed care to observe, and then address, systemic pat-
terns of MCO overreaching that develop. Most important, statutes
should explicitly provide for a private cause of action for aggrieved
HCPs, to ensure that HCPs can be heard and not have their case de-
railed by unfair tactics on the part of MCOs. Given the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran and
Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller, these state laws would not
run afoul of ERISA, since they would not be deemed to affect the oper-
ation of an employee benefit plan, but would only have an indirect
economic effect on it. Even if they did, they would be saved by the
insurance savings clause, as were the state laws at issue in Rush Pru-
dential and Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans.
not always have a specific HCP protection statute on which to rely. The plaintiffs
in Grossman, Sammarco, and Wagner have not yet been successful.
332. At the same time, the paucity of lawsuits that have been brought, in comparison
to the number of HCPs terminated from health plans and the larger number of
HCPs whose contracts are simply not renewed, suggests that advocacy protection
laws cannot be viewed as the best or only remedy for aggrieved HCPs. Such a
conclusion follows because of the high costs of litigation and the practical diffi-
culty of making a case, given the shifting burdens of production and persuasion
and the hurdles posed by discovery, which may make it difficult for a HCP to
show that he or she was terminated or non-renewed solely because of patient
advocacy.
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